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Philosophy in a World of Injustice 
Aaron Landau 
 
My dissertation is about the moral epistemology of a theory of injustice. The orthodox paradigm 
maintains that we require an ideal theory of a perfectly just society in order to justify the principles 
for dealing with injustice. In contrast, I show that a theory of injustice is not dependent on ideal 
theory and develop a pragmatic realist alternative by critically engaging with the work of Elizabeth 
Anderson. My approach is pragmatist in stressing the importance of testing our principles against 
actual experience of their practical consequences, but it is realist in holding that justification must 
take into account the unjust motivations and actions of other agents. Whether racial integration is 
an imperative of justice depends on the extent to which unjust opposition to it means that 
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Recently, many social and political philosophers have expressed doubts about an “ideal 
theory” of a perfectly just society and whether it is useful or necessary for identifying how we 
should address existing injustices. Dissatisfied with the apparent irrelevance of ideal theory for 
urgent real-world problems, such as racial inequality, global poverty, or state oppression, some 
philosophers have sought to find ways of constructing a theory of justice that would more 
effectively illuminate the nature of current injustices and tell us how to respond to them.1 
Conversely, others have argued that ideal theory is helpful and even essential for knowing how to 
remedy unjust social arrangements.2 Despite their differences, however, all these philosophers can 
be understood as sharing a fundamental concern, namely, how to develop a “nonideal theory” that 
justifies our duties regarding how we are to deal with present injustices. In other words, they are 
interested in discovering a sound philosophical methodology or moral epistemology that would 
enable them to gain knowledge about how we should act in our unjust world.   
This dissertation is about “nonideal methodology” or the moral epistemology of nonideal 
theory and how we are to justify requirements of justice about how we should respond to current 
social injustices. In particular, as I will understand it, a nonideal methodology or moral 
 
1 E.g. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2011); Amartya Sen, The Idea of 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2011); Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of 
Integration (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2013); Gerald F. Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a 
Diverse Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
2 E.g. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. ed (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999); 
Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); A. John Simmons, 
“Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 5–36; Tommie Shelby, “Racial Realities 
and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” Critical Philosophy of Race 1, no. 2 (2013): 145–62; Tommie 
Shelby, Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 




epistemology (a) identifies certain factors (e.g. principles, values, or facts) as necessary or 
significant premises for justifying some of our duties in relation to existing injustices and (b) 
explains why those factors are required or important. For example, in my view, the debate 
concerning ideal theory is about whether a theory of a just society is essential for identifying some 
of the premises (e.g. principles) that are needed to justify how to cope with the problems of unjust 
circumstances. Alternatively, we may want to know if and why people’s unwillingness to comply 
with standards of justice is relevant for ascertaining an agent’s duties of justice in nonideal theory. 
Although these matters may seem abstract, they can also be very practically significant because 
they indicate how philosophers and everyone as moral agents are to determine their duties of 
justice in the unjust societies and world we live in.  
In this dissertation, I will show that justifying requirements of justice in nonideal theory is 
not dependent on ideal theory and develop a pragmatist alternative by critically engaging with the 
work of Elizabeth Anderson. My approach is pragmatist in stressing the importance of testing our 
principles against actual experience of their practical consequences, but it is also realistic in 
holding that moral justification must take into account the unjust behavior and motivations of other 
agents. In particular, I will demonstrate that whether racial integration is an imperative of justice 
depends on the extent to which unjust opposition to it means that conflicting courses of action have 
a better chance of mitigating racial injustice. My arguments will not only contribute to 
philosophical reflection about moral justification in nonideal theory but also better enable us to 
discern how we should respond to the injustices of our time. 
Chapter 1 will show that we can construct a systematic nonideal theory without ideal 
theory. I will consider all the main justifications for the necessity of ideal theory and contend that 




principles of justice, (2) priority rules, (3) evaluative principles for measuring overall injustice, (4) 
our fair burdens of sacrifice, or because we must take into account (5) the prospect of achieving a 
just society. Furthermore, my analysis will highlight the fact that some principles, institutions, 
policies, and actions may be required by justice only if other conditions are fulfilled and that these 
conditions may be undermined by injustice. My argument will also demonstrate that our duties of 
justice depend on the evidential probabilities that various courses of action will advance justice. 
The last two points are significant for issues beyond ideal theory and will be very important in 
later chapters. 
Chapter 2 will examine Elizabeth Anderson’s pragmatist nonideal methodology which is 
considered to be one of the main alternatives to the ideal theoretic approach. I will defend a 
reconstructed pragmatism that is centered on an experimental or empiricist moral epistemology 
and that better recognizes the importance of unjust motivations and actions in moral justification 
than Anderson’s view does. The most important pragmatist method is “experiments in living” or 
a process or condition in which a moral view is realized such that we can obtain empirical evidence 
of its actual consequences and of people’s moral intuitions in response to them. I will support the 
claims that experiments in living (a) can provide better evidence and deliver better justified 
judgments than a priori modes of reasoning, (b) that the empirical evidence they supply is 
necessary for justification and (c) that their evidence can be part of a sufficient justification apart 
from a priori methods, if certain epistemological conditions are met. In addition, while I will agree 
with Anderson that nonideal theory should be empirically realistic in that it must involve causal 
investigations into existing injustices and their solutions, I will reject her position that the 
justification of requirements of justice need not take into account the unwillingness of others to 




suffers from a status quo bias and a blindspot to the unjust advantages of a social system and that 
it downgrades the agency of the victims of injustice. 
Chapter 3 considers Anderson’s argument that racial integration is necessary to correct 
some of the unjust effects of racial segregation in the United States and that integration is an 
imperative of justice. I will defend her view that residential and social integration is a corrective 
necessity and for the sake of argument, accept that integration could be realized through certain 
public policies which are feasible, morally permissible, and not too costly if particular black 
Americans, white Americans, and the state each perform certain actions. Nevertheless, I will 
contend that Anderson does not establish that any moral agent has a duty to promote integration. 
Conversely, I will argue that Shelby does not demonstrate that integration is not required to remedy 
certain racial injustices, that it is not a duty of justice, or that we should benefit black 
neighborhoods instead. One reason that both their arguments fail is that they do not appreciate how 
the unjust conduct and dispositions of other agents can make fostering their respective principles 
or policies infeasible, impermissible, unreasonably burdensome, or less likely to mitigate racial 
injustice than other courses of action in existing circumstances. These mistakes stem from serious 
errors in their nonideal methodologies, which discount the importance of unjust actions and 
motives for justifying requirements of justice. Although I will not be able to determine whether 
various agents have a duty to promote integration, the revitalization of black neighborhoods, or 
black self-segregation, I will show how these imperatives should be ascertained and where 




Chapter 1: Ideal and Systematic Theory 
For many philosophers, rectifying injustice is the practical motivation for constructing a 
theory of justice. Faced with paradigmatic wrongs, such as human trafficking, racial 
discrimination, genocide, easily remediable poverty, and the gross abuse of state power, we are 
often able to make confident judgments about their injustice and to identify courses of action that 
would alleviate them and bring about a more just world. Nevertheless, reflection reveals that even 
evident injustices have complex dimensions that require conceptual elucidation and that call for 
new and finer evaluative and practical responses. In addition, there are many problems for which 
it is difficult to discern what justice demands. It is not immediately clear, for example, how exactly 
a society should distribute its liberties, opportunities, and wealth. For these reasons, moral and 
political philosophers seek to establish, not only specific judgments, but also a systematic theory 
of justice that illuminates the basic concerns at stake and that justifies the general principles that 
determine how we should address injustice. Given the complexities of social and political life, it 
may be that such a theory is not only useful but essential for a deeper understanding of the problems 
of injustice and for more effective efforts towards their abolition. 
In recent debates about nonideal methodology, one of the most significant disagreements 
concerns the “priority” or “dependence thesis” that we need an “ideal theory” of a perfectly just 
society in order to construct a more systematic nonideal theory that deals with injustice. The claim 
that ideal theory is necessary seems to have three primary and compelling sources: First, examining 
the nature of perfect justice is meant to be the only way to ascertain the most fundamental 
principles of justice, which are needed to adequately identify injustice, the priorities of justice, and 




completely just situation in which everyone is doing their part. Third, since we have a duty to 
eliminate injustice, it appears that our ultimate societal aim is to achieve a fully just society, which 
should affect our present course of social reform.3 If these claims are correct, then ideal theory is 
of immense practical importance because it would be essential for gaining significant kinds of 
knowledge about how to respond to contemporary injustices. 
Although there are many critics of the dependence claim, some of its main justifications 
remain unaddressed and existing treatments do not properly or fully diagnose its errors or their 
broader implications.4 In addition, the debate suffers from serious conceptual confusions that need 
to be dispelled. In this chapter, I will assess the most influential claims that ideal theory is essential 
for establishing (1) first principles of justice, (2) priority rules (e.g. Rawls’s famous lexical 
ordering), (3) evaluative principles for measuring overall (in)justice, (4) our fair burdens of 
sacrifice, and because we must take into account (5) the prospect of achieving a just society. I will 
contend that none of the arguments for these dependence theses show that ideal theory is essential 
for nonideal theory. Moreover, understanding why these dependence claims are mistaken will 
allow me to isolate the actual relevance of ideal theory and to develop an alternative view about 
how to construct a systematic nonideal theory, which treats the features of unjust circumstances as 
most important and is more sensitive to the conditionality of requirements of justice and to issues 
of moral and empirical uncertainty. 
 
3 E.g. Rawls, A Theory of Justice; The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1999); Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory; Laura Valentini, “On the Apparent 
Paradox of Ideal Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2009): 332–355; Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal 
Theory”; Shelby, Dark Ghettos. 
4 The critical literature includes Sen, The Idea of Justice; Anderson, The Imperative of Integration; David Wiens, 
“Against Ideal Guidance,” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 2 (2015): 433–46; Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal; Charles 
W. Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism, Transgressing Boundaries (New York, NY: 




1.1 Ideal Theory, Ideal Principles and Nonideal Theory 
The concept of “ideal theory” is understood in several different ways in the literature, but 
I will focus on two core interpretations.5 The first is strict compliance theory, which justifies 
principles of justice under the assumption that “(nearly) everyone strictly complies … with [those] 
principles.”6 The second is realistically utopian theory, which justifies principles of justice on the 
assumption that the society is a “realistic utopia” or one that is as just as is “achievable” in our 
social world, such that it “is feasible and might actually exist, if not now then at some future time 
under happier circumstances.”7 For Rawls, this means that the society is the most just that is 
possible or that may come to exist within the limits of scientific laws, human nature, modern social 
and political institutions, and the more permanent historical conditions of our time, including 
reasonable disagreement about the good life in liberal democracies and cultural diversity between 
nations.8  
Thus, when I talk about a perfectly just, a just, or an ideal society, I mean one that is either 
strictly compliant or realistically utopian. Many treat strict compliance or realistic utopianism as 
definitive of ideal theory, but there remains significant ambiguity in the literature about how 
exactly these empirical conditions constitute ideal theory, which has hindered the debate and not 
yet been addressed. The main question is whether we identify ideal theory by the fact that it 
 
5 E.g. Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (2012): 654–
664. 
6 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
13.  
7 Ideal theory also involves social arrangements larger than a domestic society (e.g. international law), but I will 
continue to speak about societies for convenience. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 6, 12. 




identifies the principles for a strictly compliant or realistically utopian society in particular or by 
the fact that it justifies principles that may merely include these kinds of social arrangements as 
part of their domain of application, which may comprise a much broader range of circumstances. 
I will argue that we should accept the first characterization because it better expresses what is 
centrally at stake in the relevant disagreements. We can formulate ideal theory in this first sense 
as follows: 
 
Ideal Theory: A theory (or the part of a theory) that justifies principles of justice (or facts) 
using an empirical premise that the relevant social arrangements are specifically (nearly) 
strictly complaint or realistically utopian, as opposed to being unjust or simply part of a 
more general set of circumstances. 
 
This definition corresponds to a more colloquial description of ideal theory as a theory that asks 
what principles govern strictly compliant or realistically utopian circumstances, but it makes 
explicit that ideal theory essentially considers the principles for those situations in particular by 
stating that the justification of the salient principles inherently contains these specific empirical 
conditions among its premises. Thus, a theory is an ideal theory if and only if it includes an 
argument that reasons (at least implicitly) from empirical premises stating that the relevant society 
is specifically a strictly compliant or a realistically utopian one. It follows that if none of the 
arguments of a theory include those particular empirical presuppositions, it is not an ideal theory. 
(I will provide an example of a theory that is not an ideal theory shortly.) 
Similarly, I propose that we should say that a principle is an “ideal principle” if and only 




particular. Ideal principles, therefore, are not to be identified by their content or even by the fact 
that they apply in fully just situations. For example, “everyone should be respected as a moral 
person” and “slavery is impermissible” are principles that should govern ideal states of affairs, but 
it is also possible to justify these principles for a more general set of circumstances or with only 
imperfectly just circumstances in view. Therefore, even though these requirements apply to a just 
society, they may not be ideal principles, or part of an ideal theory, since they may be outcomes 
of arguments that identify principles for situations that are not specifically strictly compliant or 
realistically utopian. 
These distinctions are crucial for our topic because we need to distinguish ideal theory and 
ideal principles from other kinds of moral and political theory and principles that are independently 
available to nonideal theory and that the critics of the dependence thesis do not reject. As a contrast 
to ideal theory, consider the following justification for utilitarianism. The principle of utility states 
that the right action is the one that would maximize expected welfare. One influential argument 
justifies the principle of utility based on two premises that welfare is the only basic value and that 
our only duty is to maximize expected value.9 Since the principle of utility is a universally 
applicable moral standard, incidentally, it determines what should be done in a just society. Notice, 
however, that the preceding argument for the principle of utility does not contain an empirical 
premise of strict compliance or realistic utopianism and that it does not ascertain the principles for 
a perfectly just society in particular. Hence, in this case, utilitarianism and the principle of utility 
are not established within ideal theory.10 Furthermore, the principle of utility can be directly 
 
9 Cf. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
10 All this is compatible with the possibilities that we may apply the principle of utility to perfectly just situations in 
particular and thereby do ideal theory and that some theories may consider whether the principle of utility is justified 




applied in nonideal theory to identify the right courses of actions in terms of the maximization of 
expected welfare. I will examine some non-consequentialist theories later, but the general point is 
that there are theories and principles that do not constitute and are not dependent on ideal theory, 
which have significant implications for what we should do in unjust circumstances. 
If someone suggests that an ideal theory is simply one that establishes (or accepts) 
principles that apply to a just society or a theory with any ideals or principles, then my response is 
that the proposed definition is too inclusive and that it would not capture the heart of the debate. 
For Rawls, the assumptions of strict compliance and realistic utopianism play necessary roles in 
the justification of his principles. The “guarantee of strict compliance” is needed so that the parties 
in the original position “can rely on each other to understand and to act in accordance with 
whatever principles are finally agreed to,” and the society must be a realistic utopia or else it will 
not be practically achievable.11 In contrast, we have seen that these specific empirical premises are 
not at all essential for justifying some principles that only incidentally regulate a just society. In 
addition, most of the main critics of the claim that ideal theory is necessary do not reject all 
principles that have implications for complete justice.12 Even more so, they do not reject all 
theories with moral ideals or principles of justice. Their contention is only that we do not need to 
find out the requirements of a perfectly just society in particular in order to obtain the principles 
that are necessary for our unjust circumstances. These broader characterizations of ideal theory, 
 
ideal theory. The point is that the argument for utilitarianism and the principle of utility (and other theories and 
principles) do not necessarily involve the empirical assumptions of a just society and hence are not essentially 
instances of or derived from ideal theory. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 27. 
11 Rawls, 125; Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 6. 




therefore, do not accurately represent what is at stake in the relevant disagreements and should be 
set aside. 
In contrast to ideal theory, nonideal theory justifies principles of justice for circumstances 
that are less than perfectly just. I also stipulate that the salient kinds of nonideal theory are only 
those about contemporary unjust circumstances, that is, present situations or those in the not too 
distant future. This is to ensure that the kinds of nonideal theory we discuss are about the problems 
of injustice that we do or will face. 
1.2 The Dependence Thesis 
Another basic concern is how to characterize “the dependence thesis” itself.13 I propose 
that the following formulation is suitable for each of the more specific theses we will examine. 
 
Dependence Thesis: Ideal theory is essential for justifying some of the principles or facts 
that are among the normative or empirical premises that nonideal theory needs in order to 




13 I use the term “dependence thesis” instead of the more common “priority thesis” in order to avoid confusion with 
what Rawls calls “priority rules.” “Priority thesis” also has unfortunate temporal connotations, which make it seem as 
if the main issue is where we start our theorizing. 
14 Ultimately, this definition is to be judged by whether it captures the shared claim of the more specific theses to be 
discussed. Cf. “[I]deal theory … provides … the only basis for a systematic grasp of [the] more pressing problems [of 
nonideal theory].… At least, I shall assume that a deeper understanding can be gained in no other way, and that the 
nature and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental part of a theory of justice.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 




The dependence claim states a relationship between ideal theory and certain principles or facts that 
nonideal theory requires in order to better explain or identify how we should deal with specific 
problems of injustice. For any problem of injustice and principle (or fact), ideal theory is necessary 
for nonideal theory if and only if (1) that principle cannot be justified without ideal theory, (2) 
ideal theory is able to justify that principle, and (3) that principle is able to assist us in knowing 
how to act concerning the problem at stake. One way of putting the main idea is that ideal theory 
is required for the construction of a more “systematic” and “complete” nonideal theory of justice. 
The resulting theory is more systematic in the sense that it allows us to determine and to explain 
which judgments and principles are right in terms of more fundamental principles and facts. In 
addition, the theory is more complete in that its principles and facts would entail or help support 
the right judgments for a broader set of problems of injustice. Although Rawls’s theory is a central 
source for the dependence thesis, my interest is how to develop a systematic nonideal theory more 
generally. Thus, I will follow the literature in assessing the thesis as a broader methodological 
claim that is not confined to the substance of Rawls’s views.15 
Hitherto, the primary objection to the dependence thesis has been that ideal theory is not 
necessary for a theory of comparative justice about which changes would advance justice from the 
status quo. Famously, Amartya Sen contends that we can “[make] comparative judgments about 
justice” without ideal theory just as understanding that “Everest is the tallest mountain in the 
 
15 E.g. Simmons distinguishes his defense of “Rawls’s view of the nature of, and the relationship between, ideal and 
nonideal theory in political philosophy” from “the content or substance of Rawls’s ideal and nonideal theories [with 
which] [he] quarrel[s].” Rawls is not very explicit about his exact view of the dependence of nonideal on ideal theory. 
When I cite his work, I am only pointing to texts that might support specific dependence theses, which some of his 
prominent interpreters have expressly avowed. A. John Simmons, “Disobedience and Its Objects,” Boston University 




world” is not “needed … in comparing the heights of … Kanchenjunga and Mont Blanc.”16 
Similarly, Elizabeth Anderson claims that in “normative thinking,” “[w]e recognize the existence 
of a problem before we have any idea of what would be best or most just … Nor do we need to 
know what is ideal in order to improve. Knowledge of the better does not require knowledge of 
the best.”17  
Some dismiss this critique on the grounds that it merely shows that specific judgments are 
justifiable apart from ideal theory, whereas the dependence claim is about supporting some general 
principles or the construction of a theory of justice.18 However, this is not the best interpretation 
of Sen, Anderson or other critics’ positions. Sen also holds that a “systematic theory of comparative 
justice does not need … an answer to the question ‘What is a just society?’.”19 Likewise, Anderson 
justifies principles on the basis that their implementation has solved or promises to solve actual 
injustices.20 Moreover, Sen and Anderson both subscribe to a broadly contractualist moral theory.21 
Sen, for example, counts “utilitarian[,] egalitarian [and] libertarian” principles as among the 
“distributive principles” that might be justified in a contractualist framework.22 Evidently, 
 
16 Amartya Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?,” The Journal of Philosophy 103, no. 5 (2006): 218, 
222. 
17 Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 3. 
18 E.g. Laura Valentini, “A Paradigm Shift in Theorizing about Justice? A Critique of Sen,” Economics and Philosophy 
27, no. 3 (2011): 306. 
19 Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?,” 221, 226 emphasis added. 
20 Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, secs. 1.2, 5.4. 
21 Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?,” 215–16, 225; Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 17; 
Elizabeth Anderson, “The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians,” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2010): 1–23; Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, Contract and Domination 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), chaps. 3, 4, 8. 




Anderson and Sen must hold that contractualism and some of the principles supported therein are 
not instances of ideal theory and ideal principles. Thus, to the extent that they are right, their 
perspectives represent theories of justice that can be established apart from ideal theory, not merely 
isolated judgments. 
A different response is that, contrary to what critics claim, their theories do constitute or 
depend on ideal theory. For example, while Anderson contrasts her approach to “traditional 
Rawlsian theorizing,” in which “ideal theory is an indispensible [sic] practical guide and necessary 
normative foundation for nonideal theory,” Tommie Shelby thinks that actually her “contractualist 
approach” is “perfectly compatible with traditional [Rawlsian] nonideal theory.”23 One of the 
reasons I carefully distinguish ideal theory and principles from other kinds of both is so that we 
can properly adjudicate this kind of disagreement and the independence of various theories from 
ideal theory. 
Nevertheless, often critics of the dependence thesis do not directly address its chief and 
more specific justifications. This is important because even if nonideal theory can justify some 
principles or facts and solve some problems of injustice without ideal theory, that does not mean 
that there are not others that do require a theory of perfect justice. For example, Simmons accepts 
Sen’s point about comparative judgments but contends that we must have ideal theory in order to 
chart the route to a just society, which might involve taking less than optimal comparative gains 
 
23 That is, Shelby holds that Anderson’s contractualism is compatible with the Rawlsian view that ideal theory is 
necessary for nonideal theory. Tommie Shelby, “Integration, Inequality, and Imperatives of Justice: A Review Essay,” 




in the shorter term.24 Therefore, in order to adequately weigh the fundamental case for the 
dependence thesis, we must examine its principal arguments separately. 
We can distinguish more specific dependence theses based on the different principles, 
facts, or nonideal problems for which they claim ideal theory is necessary. In particular, I will 
assess the most influential claims that ideal theory is essential for establishing (1) first principles 
of justice, (2) priority rules, (3) evaluative principles for measuring overall justice, (4) our fair 
burdens of sacrifice, and because we must take into account (5) the prospect of achieving a realistic 
utopia. 
1.3 First Principles of Justice 
Ideal theory is said to be necessary for the justification of the most fundamental or “first 
principles of justice” that explain what makes a society unjust and how it should be reformed.25 
Let us call this “the first principles thesis.” If this claim is correct, then many critics of the 
dependence thesis that variously use utilitarian, contractualist and egalitarian first principles are 
committed to the indispensability of ideal theory in spite of their official stances. So far the critical 
literature has not examined the first principles thesis directly. As I have argued, we can test its 
soundness by assessing whether the arguments for various first principles necessarily involve an 
empirical premise of strict compliance or realistic utopianism.26 
 
24  Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 34–35. 
25 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 138, 216; Shelby, Dark Ghettos, 11–13. 
26 In assessing the first principles claim, it is especially important to distinguish ideal theory from theories that contain 
values or principles that merely apply to a just society. This is because, by definition, first principles regulate all 
circumstances (of a specific type) including perfectly just conditions (unless there is no such thing as complete justice 
for conditions of that type). Hence, if any theory that establishes principles that apply to a just society is an ideal 




In fact, we have already seen that the first principles claim is not generally true. The basic 
principle of utilitarianism can be justified apart from ideal theory, and it can be used in nonideal 
theory to ascertain the right courses of action by determining which have the greatest expected 
utility. Similarly, injustices are simply violations of the principle of utility. For utilitarianism, then, 
first principles for identifying injustice and right action in nonideal theory do not depend on ideal 
theory. 
You may suspect that utilitarianism can avoid ideal theory because it is a version of 
consequentialism. Perhaps, ideal theory is indispensable for some deontological theories, 
especially contractualism in which mutual justification, reciprocity or fairness is a basic value. 
However, a structurally identical critique applies here as well. The first principle of contractualism 
is that we are “to treat rational creatures only in ways that would be allowed by principles that they 
could not reasonably reject” or could “recognize as justifiable.”27 According to Scanlon, we assess 
the justifiability of a principle by comparing the burdens different feasible principles would impose 
on various single individuals in the relevant circumstances. An individual can reasonably reject a 
principle just in case she can propose an alternative principle which is not comparably burdensome 
for any other individual. For any moral agent (including collective or institutional agents), then, 
the principles that are reasonably rejectable by none are those that generate (roughly) the weakest 
individual burden or complaint in the circumstances. Importantly, this first principle and its test of 
reasonable rejection are not established in ideal theory or for a perfectly just society in particular. 
 
an ideal theory. Since the proponents of the first principles thesis do not seem to be asserting something so trivial, we 
should adopt my more restrictive formulation of ideal theory. 
27 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 




Instead, they are justified by much more general considerations about the distinctive value of 
human beings as rational agents with the capacity to assess reasons and the reasonableness of 
principles.28 Moreover, both contractualism’s basic principle and justificatory method can be 
directly applied to nonideal situations without taking a detour to ideal theory. In nonideal theory, 
contractualism justifies principles for any given agent based on the relative costs various principles 
would have on individuals in unjust circumstances; no input from the ideal is necessary. Moreover, 
injustices or moral wrongs just are violations of principles that no one can reasonably reject in the 
circumstances. Hence, as with utilitarianism, ideal theory is not essential for deriving or applying 
the first principles that identify injustice or just social reforms in contractualist nonideal theory.29 
How about views for which justice is fundamentally about realizing or approximating an 
equal or sufficient distribution across individuals of some good? These first principles are non-
comparative, and any comparative principle of relative inequality or insufficiency is essentially an 
explication of the perfect distributional standard.30 For these views, therefore, it may seem that 
first principles are ideal principles that must be identified within ideal theory. In fact, these 
principles do not require ideal theory because they do not have anything specifically to do with a 
 
28 Scanlon, chaps. 2.6, 4–5. 
29 Wiens also distinguishes ideal principles from more fundamental principles of justice, but he stresses that more 
fundamental and especially first principles are “evaluative principles” that rank the desirability of options as opposed 
to “deontic principles” that specify which actions are “obligatory, permissible, and impermissible.” In contrast, my 
analysis shows that there are familiar first principles that are deontic. In addition, he does not explicitly address the 
issue of whether ideal theory is necessary to justify his basic evaluative principles. (I discuss evaluative principles in 
§§5-6.) Hamlin and Stemplowska separate ideal theory from what they call the “theory of ideals,” but for them ideal 
theory is about identifying “social arrangements” and “principles” are part of the theory of ideals. Thus, they do not 
speak directly to the present contention, which in their terms, lies within the theory of ideals. David Wiens, “Will the 
Real Principles of Justice Please Stand Up?,” in Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, ed. Kevin Vallier and 
Michael Weber (Oxford University Press, 2017), 152–53; Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance”; Alan Hamlin and Zofia 
Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals,” Political Studies Review 10, no. 1 (2012): 53. 
30 David Estlund, “Just and Juster,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2, ed. David Sobel, Peter 




society that is strictly compliant or realistically utopian. Rather, the entire justification for these 
non-comparative and comparative principles is the value of an equal or sufficient distribution, 
which is independent from the conduct of moral agents or social institutions. For this reason, we 
can know that we should aim for more equality or sufficiency, even if complete equality and 
sufficiency are not applicable in ideal theory because the members of a fully just society are not 
able to realize these perfect distributions. Therefore, although non-comparative and perfect 
standards are essential to these first principles and their comparative counterparts, ideal theory is 
not. 
It is possible to construct similar critiques for many other kinds of moral and political 
theories, including luck egalitarianism, relational egalitarianism, republicanism, and left and right 
libertarianism, but we have said enough to show that the first principles thesis is not a sound 
methodological claim. Justifying fundamental principles of justice does not in general require ideal 
theory. 
1.4 Priority Rules 
One of the main ways in which ideal theory is taken to be essential for nonideal theory is 
by supplying “priority rules” that rank or weigh the relative urgency of different principles of 
justice and injustices.31 Call this “the priority rules thesis.” This thesis entails that several critics 
who make use of priority rules implicitly rely on ideal theory and has not yet been assessed.32 In 
order to see that the priority rules claim is incorrect, we only need to modestly extend the 
 
31 E.g. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 216, 343; Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 34. 





arguments from the previous section. Utilitarianism would determine the comparative importance 
of different principles just as it does actions, that is, in terms of how much they are expected to 
increase overall welfare. In some circumstances, satisfying some principles (e.g. implement the 
social conditions for personal autonomy) might generate more welfare than meeting others. In that 
case, utilitarianism would imply priority rules that weight the former principles more than the 
latter, in those circumstances. Since there is no reason why this could not be straightforwardly 
done for nonideal situations, knowledge of the ideal is extraneous. 
Similarly, contractualism justifies principles in terms of their comparative burdens for 
single individuals. We can simply extend this procedure to the justification of higher-order 
principles like priority rules and compare the burdens that are attached to various weightings or 
rankings of certain first-order principles. The right set of priority rules would weigh or rank a 
principle more or higher just in case following it over the others would burden individuals less 
than complying with the others over it. 
We would be able to derive such rules if we had an account of individual’s interests and 
the priorities among them. Since contractualism holds that the power of rational autonomy is what 
is most valuable about human beings, we would expect that it would count the promotion of that 
capacity as persons’ highest or lexically prior interest. It follows that priority rules that sacrifice 
that interest for others would entail greater burdens for individuals than those that promote it over 
others. Therefore, contractualism would produce priority rules that give precedent to principles 
that require the effective establishment of the means necessary to protect and cultivate rational 
autonomy. If these means include the basic liberties (e.g. freedom of conscience, freedom of 




of liberty.”33 However, since the basic liberties are of first importance for individuals’ interests in 
many nonideal circumstances and the contractualist method can be applied directly to these 
situations, the priority of liberty does not require ideal theory for its justification. It is clear that a 
similar argument could be run for other priority rules. We could also enumerate parallel critiques 
within other moral frameworks, but these counterexamples are sufficient to undermine the priority 
rules thesis as a general methodological truth.  
1.5 Approximating the Ideal 
Another dependence claim is “the evaluative principles thesis” that we need ideal theory 
in order to justify “[evaluative] standards for judging the overall justice of particular social 
arrangements,”34 where these assessments are based on how much a society “approximates” the 
complete satisfaction of ideal principles. Formal methods of approximation state that we measure 
how much a society fulfills ideal principles “more” or “less” by some formal criterion that does 
not depend on the content or the comparative importance of ideal principles. In contrast, 
substantive methods are derived from the content and relative significance of certain ideal 
principles. For example, Rawls says that “the extent of the deviation from perfect justice … is 
guided by the priority indicated by [his] lexical ordering,” which suggests that departing from the 
equal liberties principle makes a society more unjust than violations of the fair equal opportunity 
and difference principles.35  
 
33 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 82. 
34 Shelby, Dark Ghettos, 12. 




Many philosophers have persuasively argued that formal methods commit a logical fallacy, 
which is usually called “the problem of the second-best.”36 For example, in an ideal socialist 
society, perhaps (i) the state should follow a distributive principle of equality of income and (ii) 
citizens ought to and will seek to maximize their pretax income, even though it will be equally 
redistributed.37 If it is always better to satisfy more ideal principles than less, then in our nonideal 
circumstances, (i) the state should distribute income equally, even if (ii) does not hold and citizens 
are not incentivized to maximize their pretax income. Yet, it is reasonable to think that this may 
not lead to more justice but less because equal redistribution may severely hamper production and 
end up disadvantaging everyone in comparison to allowing some inequality. The same basic 
mistake is also exhibited in the reasoning that since having {a salad and dressing} is delightful, it 
would be better for me to have the {dressing} alone rather than neither. Therefore, the fact that 
some principles are ideal principles does not establish that obtaining more or a greater degree of 
them delivers more justice. Indeed, justice may demand that we depart even further from ideal 
principles (e.g. by embracing inequality of income). 
However, proponents of the evaluative principles thesis have not advocated a formal 
method but a substantive one using priority rules. Nevertheless, substantive approximation faces 
similar problems. Suppose that in ideal theory, the basic liberties are prioritized because they are 
 
36 “[I]t is not true that a situation in which more, but not all, of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or 
is even likely to be, superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled.” R. G. Lipsey and K. J. Lancaster, “The General 
Theory of Second Best,” Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956): 11–33; Robert E. Goodin, “Political Ideals and 
Political Practice,” British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 1 (1995): 37–56; Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, 
“The Feasibility Issue,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 258–82; David Wiens, “Assessing Ideal Theories Lessons from the Theory of Second Best,” Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics 15, no. 2 (2016): 132–49. 
37 Joseph H. Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market: An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); David Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political 




necessary for and able to advance citizens’ most important interests.38 Yet, since the basic liberties 
can effectively promote those interests only if certain material and social conditions are satisfied,39 
it follows that the priority of liberty does not hold if those conditions are undermined by injustice. 
For example, the state may not have the capacities to meet the prerequisites for the priority of 
liberty because of intractable economic wrongs (e.g. tax evasion, capital flight, fraud etc.) by other 
agents and thereby may not be obligated to follow that principle. This demonstrates that the fact 
that certain priority rules are ideal principles does not establish that moral agents should apply or 
approximate them in nonideal theory, when other aspects of a just society are infeasible or will be 
missing. In fact, instead of exacerbating injustice, justice may permit or require deviations from 
ideal priority rules. 
 In spite of their differences, both the formal and substantive methods of approximation 
fail to guarantee greater justice for the same reason, namely, that whether meeting any ideal 
principle (including priority rules) will deliver more justice may be contingent on the other features 
of perfectly just circumstances, such as the fulfillment of other ideal principles or certain empirical, 
social and normative conditions. Since the value of an ideal principle in terms of justice may be 
dependent on certain conditions and these conditions may be absent in nonideal situations, it is a 
fallacy to infer from the fact that certain principles are ideal that we should apply or approximate 




38 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 82. 




Approximation Fallacy: For any valuable set of conditions and any specific condition 
within it, it is a fallacy to infer from the value of that set that, when some of the conditions 
in the set are lacking, it is better to realize that particular condition, for the value of that 
condition may depend on the others.40 
 
The approximation fallacy explains why it is a mistake to infer from the perfect justice of satisfying 
ideal principles that we should approximate them using formal or substantive rules. It also means 
that ideal theory per se or merely establishing ideal principles is necessarily insufficient for 
justifying principles to apply or approximate in nonideal theory, when the situation is such that a 
just society cannot or will not be realized. Therefore, for these practical contexts, it is wrong to 
think that merely completing ideal theory could provide possible support for the first principles, 
priority rules, or evaluative principles claims by exemplifying one way in which ideal theory can 
justify principles for nonideal theory. 
The approximation fallacy has important implications for the relevance of ideal theory that 
have not been spelled out.41 The present insufficiency of ideal theory means that in order to 
establish principles to apply or approximate for situations in which complete justice cannot or will 
not happen, we must go outside of ideal theory and justify principles for certain nonideal situations 
specifically or for a more general set of circumstances, which may include nonideal and ideal 
 
40 This is different than Estlund’s “Fallacy of Approximation,” which is the error of reasoning according to a formal 
method that he calls the “Superset Principle.” The “Approximation Fallacy” captures why both formal and substantive 
methods are fallacious. I am indebted to Estlund’s extensive discussion of Superset. Cf. David Estlund, Utopophobia: 
On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy (Draft, 2018), 262. 
41 The literature tends to focus on how formal approximation is erroneous and does not pursue the constructive 
dimensions I will outline. As Wiens argues, the problem of the second-best does not mean that ideal theory is not 
necessary for identifying a long-term target for nonideal theory, but I will address that dependence claim in §8. Wiens, 




contexts. What the fallacy rules out is the option of deducing these principles from ideal principles 
without further argument. Deductions of nonideal from ideal principles could be justified by more 
general principles that regulate both unjust and just societies, but if these latter principles are 
already available, then we would not need ideal theory anyway. Nevertheless, ideal theory may 
provide significant or necessary inductive or abductive evidence for defending principles that 
apply in nonideal theory. For example, ideal principles may be inductive or abductive grounds for 
formulating more general principles or we may assess independently derived general principles by 
ascertaining ideal principles from them and testing both against our considered judgments about a 
just society. One reason why ideal theory might be essential or important for these purposes is that 
its assumptions of strict compliance or realistic utopianism may make the problem of identifying 
ideal principles much simpler and more theoretically tractable than more directly tackling the 
question of which principles apply to the messy realities of contemporary unjust societies. The 
proposal, then, would be that we can gain inductive or abductive support for some principles for 
nonideal theory more easily via ideal theory and that it may be too difficult to justify those 
principles independently of such evidence. I will leave open the possibility that in some epistemic 
circumstances, ideal theory may supply helpful, significant or even necessary evidence.42 It is 
worth noting, however, that this is a much more epistemologically contingent role for ideal theory 
than the supporters of the dependence thesis have usually put forth. Whether ideal theory is 
necessary or significant in the above ways simply depends on the strength of the independently 
available arguments and evidence for the principles of nonideal theory. We have already seen that 
 
42 There are reasons to doubt the reliability of normative and non-normative evidence that can only be ascertained via 
ideal theory because a perfectly just society is remote from our actual experience. I examine the justificatory 




first principles and priority rules can be established without ideal theory, and we will see that 
evaluative principles can as well. Similarly, insofar as we must test our principles against our 
considered judgments about particular cases, it is often enough that they produce the right 
conclusions for an adequate set of nonideal cases. The approximation fallacy also has significant 
and unexplored consequences for nonideal theory more generally, which I will discuss in the last 
section. 
1.6 Measuring the Extent of (In)justice 
I have challenged the evaluative principles thesis by showing how ideal theory cannot 
justify evaluative standards for measuring the overall justice of a society. Presently, I will take a 
more direct approach and demonstrate how we can justify and apply evaluative principles apart 
from ideal theory. There are two main conceptions of overall justice and evaluative standards. On 
the first, justice is fundamentally a virtue of moral agents and society is unjust only to the extent 
that, in the circumstances, agents have duties of justice to sustain or reform it in some way and are 
not compliant.43 In evaluating the justice of a society, then, we are assessing the degree to which 
either (1) a particular institutional or group agent (e.g. the state or the people as a collective body) 
or (2) society as a collection of distinct agents (e.g. the state, the people, associations, families, 
and individual citizens etc.) are fulfilling their respective duties of justice. In the former case, we 
would examine how far the institutional or group agent satisfies its obligations of justice and the 
severity of its failures, whereas in the latter case, it is a matter of weighing the same for each 
separate agent and making some kind of aggregative judgment of overall societal justice. The 
 
43 Several defenders of the dependence claim are committed to this view of justice. E.g. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 
5; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 215ff; Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 15–17, 17 note 16; Shelby, Dark 





intuitive idea is that the more separate agents commit injustice and the more grievous those wrongs, 
the more unjust society is as a whole. 
Either way, the evaluative principles that nonideal theory requires are those that identify 
the duties of societal agents in unjust circumstances and the significance of meeting those duties. 
We have seen that we do not need ideal theory to justify principles for nonideal obligations, such 
as first principles and priority rules. In addition, first principles often imply standards for 
measuring the importance of performing certain duties. For example, the principle of utility 
implicitly ranks available actions in terms of their expected welfare, which allows us to assess the 
severity of an unjust action by the extent to which an agent can but does not choose actions with 
more expected welfare.44 Similarly, for contractualism, what makes an act wrong are the burdens 
that make principles that permit it ones it would be reasonable to reject. The extent of an act’s 
wrongfulness, therefore, is to be judged by how much it fails to show proper respect for the greater 
burdens of some individuals. Since we can justify principles for ascertaining nonideal obligations 
and their importance apart from ideal theory, we can also judge the overall justice of a society 
independently and the evaluative principles thesis is incorrect. 
On the second conception, evaluating the overall justice of a society is taken to be a 
measurement of the value of a state of affairs, which can be developed into an axiology or ranking 
of the desirability of different states of affairs. Axiological considerations, however, do not support 
the evaluative principles thesis either. For example, utilitarianism and contractualism entail 
axiological principles that rank social arrangements in terms of their expected utility and burdens 
 
44 Other relevant factors may include agents’ motivations, the difficulty of compliance, and epistemic limitations, but 




for individuals. The arguments for these evaluative principles would involve the importance of 
maximizing welfare and the contractualist requirement and analysis of justifiability, but the 
assumption that society is perfectly just, and hence ideal theory, is unnecessary. 
In addition, it would be a mistake to identify the wrongs of a society and the extent of its 
injustice by how far its axiological value falls short of an ideal society’s. Although a just society 
is a state of affairs that could be reached if everyone complies with their duties (within some 
limitations), this does not imply anything about the responsibilities we have in unjust 
circumstances. To see this, consider: 
 
Beach: X and Y are at the beach looking out onto the waters. They see Z drowning. If X 
and Y attempt to rescue Z together they will succeed without paying any significant costs. 
However, neither X nor Y is strong enough to rescue Z alone. Indeed, if X or Y tries to 
rescue Z alone, they will drown along with Z. These facts are known to X and Y. 
 
This is a standard rescue case but for multiple agents, in which the morally best outcome is 
attainable just in case X and Y rescue Z together. Yet, even so, this does not entail that X has a 
moral duty to rescue Z or that Y does. This is because neither X nor Y can or has the ability to 
rescue Z independently of the other, and it would be too costly and only make things morally worse 
if they tried to (i.e. two people will die instead of one). Whether X has a duty to rescue Z is 
conditional on whether Y will engage in rescue and vice versa. Hence, if Y is not willing to rescue 




either. It also follows that if neither X nor Y is willing, then neither X nor Y does any wrong in 
neglecting to save Z.45 
Similarly, realizing a just state of affairs necessarily involves the cooperation of many 
moral agents. For example, satisfying a principle of equal opportunity not only requires the state 
to uphold just laws, but schools, corporations, and individuals must also supply education and jobs 
in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. Since no single agent is able to bring about perfect justice 
on its own, none has the obligation or can be deemed unjust for failing to do so. Furthermore, 
societal agents’ capacities and duties for advancing justice are dependent on the actions of others.46 
Therefore, even if the members of a society are able to and ought to fulfill certain duties that would 
jointly bring about a just society when everyone is acting rightly in ideal theory, it does not follow 
that they can satisfy or have any of these obligations when many commit injustice. Hence, in 
nonideal theory, we cannot ascertain the degree of a society’s injustice from its difference in value 
from an ideal state of affairs.47 
 
45 Cf. David Estlund, “Prime Justice,” in Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, ed. Michael Weber and Kevin 
Vallier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 51ff. 
46 This is something we already saw in discussing the approximation fallacy. 
47 I will address the remaining question of whether the axiological value of a just state of affairs is essential for 
ascertaining which actions we should take in nonideal theory in §8. Gerald Gaus considers if we must do ideal theory 
in order to approximate the institutions or social structures of a just society. We may call this “the structural similarity 
thesis.” The main idea is that gaining more similarity to the ideal may enable us to achieve greater heights of justice 
in the long run than choosing more dissimilar options that promise more justice now. The essential role of ideal theory 
here is not to eventually allow us to fully realize perfect justice, but only to decrease our distance from its institutions. 
Gaus is well aware of the approximation fallacy, but for the sake of argument, he assumes there is a reliable correlation 
between institutional closeness to perfect justice and comparative justice. His own objection to this argument is that 
the justice of supposedly ideal institutions is too uncertain to justify sacrificing the more certain advances in justice 
that dissimilar social arrangements offer to us. But, there seems to be a more fundamental problem as well: Why do 
we need ideal theory in order to identify the social structures we should approximate? We are not currently interested 
in achieving a perfectly just society per se, so we can restrict our sights to nonideal institutions. Furthermore, as we 
have seen and as Gaus presupposes, we can justify and apply principles for measuring the comparative justice of social 
institutions independently of ideal theory. Therefore, if there are some structural arrangements that we should 
approximate in the long run, we seem to have sufficient resources to ascertain what they are apart from ideal theory. 




1.7 Fair Shares and Burdens 
The moral aim of realizing complete justice can be understood as a requirement that is the 
shared responsibility of a collection of distinct agents. For such collective requirements, some 
argue that it is unfair to be required to sacrifice more than we would be in a situation in which 
everyone complies with their fairly distributed duties towards their common end.48 This is a 
version of “the fair burdens thesis” that in order to know our fair level of sacrifice in nonideal 
theory, we need to do ideal theory. 
Against the moral importance of strict compliance, David Enoch argues that “whether or 
not some expected behavior of others is in compliance with the moral requirements applying to 
them is intrinsically irrelevant to what ought to be done” by an agent who is a “third-part[y] or 
bystander[]” and not the perpetrator or patient of wrongdoing.49 However, even for third-parties, 
it is plausible that noncompliance is inherently morally significant. For example, many people 
accept that harm is worse when it is the result of a moral violation rather than a natural accident 
and that thereby bystanders have additional reasons to prevent or rectify such harms.50 
Furthermore, we may want to know the moral effects of noncompliance when we are among the 
victims of unfairness. For these reasons, my critique of the fair burdens thesis will not deny the 
 
48 Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory. 
49 David Enoch, “Against Utopianism: Noncompliance and Multiple Agents,” Philosopher’s Imprint 18, no. 16 (2018): 
sec. 3. 
50 This is a central feature of Tadros’s “Victims of Unfairness” argument. Enoch cites Tadros, but he does not address 
this part of Tadros’s reasoning, which is inconsistent with his noncompliance as “merely circumstances” thesis. I do 
not think Enoch’s arguments undermine the idea that third-parties have intrinsic reasons to stop wrongdoing. The idea, 
for example, plausibly applies to his lifeguard and drowning child case (see below). Victor Tadros, “Permissibility in 




moral relevance of wrongdoing or unfairness. I shall only argue that ideal theory and strict 
compliance across contemporary societies is not necessary for ascertaining our fair costs. 
There are two primary kinds of argument in favor of the view that our nonideal burdens 
are normatively dependent on strict compliance, which are not clearly distinguished in the 
literature. First, some maintain that a person has more or less reason to address harm or wrong if, 
and because, some agent does not perform the fair obligations they have under strict compliance. 
In these cases, it is assumed that the noncompliers have the same duty in partial and full compliance 
and that we can thereby discern their present wrongdoing by seeing how their actions deviate from 
those in ideal theory. The question is how their noncompliance with their duties under full 
compliance affects others’ fair burdens in nonideal theory. A lifeguard, for example, may have a 
duty to save a drowning child when she fulfills it (strict compliance) and when she does not (partial 
compliance)—what should others do when she fails to comply?51 Do they have less or even more 
reason to save the child because her situation is the result of unfairness or wrongdoing? While it 
may work for some localized cases, assuming strict compliance across an entire society with a 
great number of people is not a reliable way of identifying people’s actual obligations. This is 
because (as we saw with the approximation fallacy and the Beach case) whether an agent has the 
ability or duty to perform a certain action may be contingent on the actual (or expected) behavior 
of others. Hence, what I can and am required to do in the highly counterfactual scenario in which 
all societal agents are compliant may be drastically different than what I am able to or should do 
in contemporary circumstances where I can expect many to act wrongly. Perhaps, Susan is the 
 
51 Enoch discusses this case in the context of strict compliance and ideal theory. Tadros’s cases have this structure as 
well. Although I wrote about the significance of multiple agents for ideal theory before reading Enoch’s paper, several 
of my arguments (including the present one) are related to Enoch’s point about the importance of multiple agents in 




foremost expert in national healthcare who, in full compliance, would have a duty to implement a 
fully just healthcare system because she would receive plentiful material resources and the 
cooperation of many other individuals and institutions. Yet, clearly this does not imply that she 
has a duty to or could do the same in partial compliance where she may receive very little or none 
of the assistance she needs to fulfill that project. Therefore, if ideal theory is in general supposed 
to be necessary for ascertaining our fair burdens in nonideal theory, it cannot be because we ought 
to act as we would assuming strict compliance and that departures from ideal duties constitute 
injustice or unfairness. Hence, the fair burdens thesis requires another basis. 
The second model assigns special importance to the fair shares or net benefits and burdens 
(e.g. in well-being, primary goods, wealth, etc.) that we would have in ideal theory. The 
distribution of shares under strict compliance may be fair because it is a situation in which every 
agent is doing her part, an outcome of just institutions, or satisfies some criterion of equality.52 In 
addition, Liam Murphy argues that “[i]f there is such a thing as a fair allocation of responsibility 
[i.e. shares], it is natural to think that it is unfair … to require agents, under partial compliance, to 
exceed that fairly allocated responsibility.”53 He concludes, therefore, that in nonideal theory, a 
person is only obligated, if and only if she is able and it would be beneficial to the shared end (of 
justice), to make sacrifices up to, but not beyond, her fair shares as identified under strict 
compliance or that it is in some way unfair if she has to do more.54 This kind of argument for the 
 
52 E.g. “any plausible agent-neutral principle automatically distributes compliance effects fairly under full compliance; 
at least … if we employ a minimal notion of fairness,” namely, “formal fairness [that] requires a distribution be equal 
unless there are good grounds for departing from equality.” Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, 90, 107, 
112. 
53 Murphy, 93. 




fair burdens claim does not suffer from the difficulties I highlighted for the preceding one because 
it does not state that we are to act as in ideal theory but only that we must take on our full 
compliance (i) costs only if (ii) it is possible and (iii) beneficial for social justice (and that it is 
unfair if more is demanded). So, even if Susan has a duty to give $50,000 in ideal theory, this line 
of reasoning does not say that she must do the same in nonideal theory. It may be that she only has 
$10,000 to contribute under partial compliance, in which case no one can complain that she is 
doing less than her fair share ($50,000) because she is not able. Likewise, while some actions 
suitable in ideal theory would be unjust in nonideal theory, this problem is avoided by measuring 
our required burdens in terms of well-being or social goods and by specifying that sacrifice is 
mandated only if it is conducive to greater justice. 
Fairness is meant to explain why strict compliance and its associated shares are essential 
for our nonideal burdens. However, that the distribution of costs should be fair does not mean that 
it must be based on full compliance. For example, an agent’s duties and burdens might be fair just 
in case they are demanded by a requirement of equal concern for everyone’s interests in the 
relevant nonideal circumstances. This principle may be justified (e.g. by the equal standing of 
persons or citizens) and applied directly to unjust conditions without involving strict compliance. 
Moreover, even if the allocation of shares in ideal theory is fair that does not imply that an identical 
distribution is also fair when there is substantial injustice. For when the ideal distribution of shares 
does not exist, some people may be extremely disadvantaged in comparison to others and fairness 
may very well entail more costly duties than in ideal theory to mitigate that disparity.55 Therefore, 
 
55 Murphy stresses that we should not conflate his “limited notion of unfairness” about taking on “responsibilities that 
rightly belong to others” with “the fairness of the distribution of well-being.” However, this would not be responsive 




fairness in distributing burdens does not implicate ideal theory, at least without additional 
argument. 
The present case for the fair burdens claim, then, seems to rest mainly on intuitive 
considerations, but it faces very strong objections here as well. Consider: 
 
Ideal Distribution: X is an affluent member of society who could do much to assist those 
who suffer from injustice (e.g. by providing adequate healthcare, better education, etc.) 
with little cost to herself. However, society is extremely unequal with most of its economic 
and political power concentrated in a class of people Y who are significantly better off than 
X. Indeed, if everyone were to fulfill their duties of justice, then the redistribution and use 
of Y’s resources (and others’ compliance) would be so effectual that X would have to give 
nothing to correct injustice. Moreover, her fair share would consist of even more societal 
goods than she currently possesses. But, many including Y will not fulfill their duties and 
serious wrongs that X could easily abolish will persist. 
 
According to Murphy, it is permissible for X to do nothing on behalf of justice because in ideal 
theory she does not have any burdens. But, clearly this is too restrictive. Surely, X has a duty to 
remove the injustices she could without incurring any substantial costs, if not more. Even if 
 
being and hence, that there may be no objection based on fair burdens to being required to sacrifice more than in strict 




surpassing our fair costs under full compliance affects our nonideal burdens, it cannot set an upper 
limit to them.56 
How about a weaker thesis that someone’s exceeding her strict compliance shares provides 
a defeasible reason not to sustain more sacrifice? Does X have reasons not to rectify injustice 
simply because and to the degree that it would involve costs that surpass her fair shares in ideal 
theory? Suppose that X decides that she is required to spend $100,000 to support a policy to 
improve education in a severely disadvantaged neighborhood and that her judgment rightly takes 
into account the gravity of the need and injustice, the expected benefits and risks of her efforts, 
and the overall costs to her interests. Next, compare a situation in which X later learns that her 
plan amounts to giving $100,000 more than what would be fair in ideal theory to one in which she 
discovers that it would involve no additional costs than under strict compliance. After acquiring 
these facts, how much should X’s new view of her duty differ between these cases?57 Importantly, 
we are not now asking how much paying $100,000 would affect X’s interests because she has 
already incorporated that consideration into her initial judgment.58 The question is whether, in 
itself, sacrificing $100,000 more than what would be fair assuming strict compliance is a factor 
 
56 For similar objections: Tim Mulgan, “Two Conceptions of Benevolence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 26, no. 1 
(1997): 62–79; Tadros, “Permissibility in a World of Wrongdoing.” 
57 Cf. The argument for the (objective) wrong facts objection in Mulgan, “Two Conceptions of Benevolence.” 
However, Mulgan does not argue against the idea that strict compliance burdens have some weight, only that they do 
not have very much weight. 
58 One of Murphy’s aims is to provide a better explanation of the intuitive objection that a maximizing principle of 
beneficence is overly demanding. Is it inappropriate, then, that my argument distinguishes reasons based on fair shares 
in ideal theory from those due to costs to X’s interests? I do not think so. If exceeding strict compliance burdens 
explains the overdemandingness worry, then the latter should be felt when the former is at issue. But, this is clearly 
not true, as in cases like Ideal Distribution, in which the potential burdens are nonexistent or negligible. Therefore, 





that should affect X’s judgment about her required sacrifice. My sense is that these facts about X’s 
fair shares in ideal theory should make no difference to her judgment and that they are irrelevant 
to her nonideal burdens. At the least, it is very unclear that there are intuitively any independent 
reasons related to full compliance shares that are not confused with or better explained by the other 
considerations I have mentioned. Conversely, if X were to contribute less than she ought, it is at 
least very unclear that she would be wrong in virtue of the fact that she is giving less than her full 
compliance burdens. It seems plausible that her fault would be entirely due to not being properly 
responsive to the actual weight of her interests, to the severity of the relevant injustices, or to the 
likely risks and benefits of her actions. It follows that, while agents’ unfair actions may give us 
less or more reason to rectify injustice, strict compliance shares do not seem relevant for 
identifying those actions or explaining why they are unfair. I do not think, therefore, that concerns 
about fulfilling and not having to exceed our fair costs in ideal theory enjoy sufficient intuitive 
force to establish the fair burdens thesis either. 
1.8 Realistic Utopia as a Social Prospect 
A. John Simmons provides the most influential articulation and defense of the dependence 
thesis. His justification differs from the previous accounts in that he focuses mainly on the function 
of ideal theory in identifying a long-term practical target that we are to eventually achieve, rather 
than principles or facts that are to be more directly applied in unjust circumstances. The 
fundamental role of “ideal theory” is that it “dictates the objective” of a realistic utopia, while 
“nonideal theory dictates the route to that objective.”59 Simmons’s position is a version of “the 
realistic utopia thesis” that ideal theory is necessary for nonideal theory because the achievement 
 




of a realistic utopia is an important prospect that should affect which courses of action we adopt 
in contemporary circumstances. Unfortunately, Simmons does not give an argument for his vital 
assumption that nonideal theory has to be concerned with attaining perfect justice, and it is not 
obvious that it must. Consider the following case from Frank Jackson: 
 
Drug: Jill is a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient, John, 
who has a minor but not trivial skin complaint. She has three drugs to choose from: … 
Careful consideration of the literature has led her to the following opinions. Drug A is very 
likely to relieve the condition but will not completely cure it. One of drugs B and C will 
completely cure the skin condition; the other though will kill the patient, and there is no 
way that she can tell which of the two is the perfect cure and which the killer drug. What 
should Jill do?60 
 
I shall take it that Jill has a duty to choose drug A and that it would be impermissible for 
her to give John B or C. Although B or C is the perfect cure and these options have the greatest 
chance of restoring John to full health, it would be wrong to administer either of them because of 
the risk that they have an equal chance of killing him. Hence, Jill ought to select A because it is 
most likely to benefit John while also avoiding harm. This means that the actions we are required 
to perform are not identical to those that would in fact lead to the best or “ideal” outcome (e.g. 
perfect health) or even to those that have the highest probability of realizing the “ideal.” Even 
 





though A has a lower probability of bringing John to complete health than B or C, Jill has a duty 
to choose A. Instead, what Drug strikingly shows is that, at least in terms of consequences, we are 
to take the action our evidence indicates is the one that provides the best chance of realizing what 
is of value and of avoiding what is of disvalue.61 The basic idea is that we have more (or less) 
reason to perform an action to the extent that it has a higher probability of generating some good 
(or bad) consequence and to the degree to which the (dis)value of that outcome is greater. Other 
things equal, then, the morally right action is the one with the greatest expected value, where the 
expected value of an action is an aggregative judgment based on what the evidence indicates about 
the probabilities and the values of its possible outcomes. Hence, for our purposes, the relevant duty 
is to take the actions with the greatest expected justice (i.e. with the best chance of attaining justice 
and avoiding injustice), all things equal.62 
Drug shows that a higher chance of realizing the ideal outcome is not a conclusive 
consideration in favor of an action. What matters is the relative expected justice of various actions 
and the probabilities and values of their consequences in general, not the chances of realizing a 
just society only. It may be our moral duty, then, to try to realize outcomes other than a perfectly 
just society, if those actions have the most expected justice. It also may be, however, that our best 
chance of maximizing overall justice does involve aiming at perfect justice or, more modestly, that 
a realistic utopia is a significant prospect that is crucial for determining which courses of actions 
do have the greatest expected justice. Either would establish the realistic utopia claim. 
 
61 Michael J. Zimmerman, Ignorance and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 




However, if, in our circumstances, the outcome of a just society cannot make a difference 
to identifying the actions with the most expected justice, then it is irrelevant and the realistic utopia 
thesis collapses.63 Furthermore, our estimations of how much our available actions might influence 
the probability of achieving complete justice have to be reliable enough to potentially justify 
forgoing considerable gains in justice that are relatively likely.64 For if they are not, then we may 
set aside the possibility of perfect justice in nonideal theory because it will not change the outcome 
of any important decision about which tradeoffs in expected justice we should accept.65 I will argue 
that it is very doubtful that the prospect of bringing about a realistic utopia passes either of these 
tests because we are not capable of credibly predicting how the probability of realizing a just 
society would be affected by our actions.66 
We have seen that the expected justice of an action is a function of both the probabilities 
and the values of its possible outcomes as indicated by the evidence available to us. A prospect, 
therefore, can affect the relative expected justice of different actions only if we can ascertain, from 
our evidence, how much the probability of its occurrence would change if those various actions 
were to be taken. In other words, an outcome is significant to whether we should choose one action 
 
63 The potential critique of the realistic utopia thesis mentioned here is stronger than usual. Whereas other criticisms 
(including the one later in this paragraph) argue that we need not use ideal theory to justify duties in nonideal theory, 
this objection says we cannot use the prospect of a realistic utopia in justifying our duties because of our cognitive 
and epistemic limitations. 
64 Hamlin and Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals,” 59. 
65 Unimportant choices are about negligible sacrifices in expected justice because the outcome passed over is not very 
valuable or very unlikely. 
66 Gaus’s critique of the dependence claim is also centered on uncertainty. However, his argument is different because 
it is based on moral uncertainty about the axiological value or justice of the institutions of ideal theory. In contrast, 
my case is premised on non-moral uncertainty about the probabilities that a just society will be realized. I believe the 
non-moral epistemological difficulties for ideal theory are even worse and more insurmountable than the moral ones. 




over another only if we have the ability to predict the extent to which these actions would make 
its realization more or less probable. This means that a social prospect cannot influence which 
action maximizes expected justice in nonideal theory if we are not able to determine what its 
likelihood would be conditional on our available actions. 
The problem for the prospect of a realistic utopia is that we simply are not able to predict 
how our actions will influence its probability based on the evidence available to us. Even on 
optimistic estimates, the realization of complete justice, if it happens at all, will involve many 
radical social changes from the current state of affairs that will take a very long time to accomplish. 
Necessary to these transitions will be, across an expansive timeframe, a multitude of moral agents, 
their actions, capacities, and motivations, and numerous favorable background conditions, each of 
which depend on highly complex and interacting causal processes. Whether these actions, agents, 
and conditions will exist will be determined by, for example, the psychological, economic, social, 
political, ideological, technological, environmental, national, international, and other kinds of facts 
about the world and how they will change in the future.67 It follows that measuring the probability 
of bringing about a just society involves gaining extensive empirical knowledge about all these 
various factors and their causal relations and making reliable forecasts about how they are likely 
to develop into the distant future when perfect justice might be achieved. Only then would we be 
able to credibly judge how our available actions will influence the chances that a realistic utopia 
and all the steps needed to achieve it will occur. However, no one has the knowledge or the 
 
67 For more on the relevant types of empirical facts and a similar critique regarding the difficulties of ascertaining the 
feasibility of an ideal society, see David Wiens, “Political Ideals and the Feasibility Frontier,” Economics and 
Philosophy 31, no. 3 (2015): 452–53, 467. Unlike Wiens, I do not base my argument on knowledge of feasibility or 
the “morally optimal feasible world” because my account implies that we may be required to support the realization 




cognitive powers to make the necessary predictions. We already face substantial uncertainty with 
assessing the short and medium-term consequences of current empirical trends and policies, let 
alone their effects on the probability of an extremely remote ideal. Unfortunately, our ignorance 
means that the prospect of a realistic utopia cannot assist us in establishing the actions with the 
most expected justice in nonideal theory. Or, if we believe we can draw some vague estimations, 
they may be ignored in nonideal theory because they are bound to be too unreliable to justify 
sacrificing any relatively certain and important advance in justice. The realistic utopia thesis, 
therefore, fails. 
Simmons allows that we may not be able to adjust our actions to the goal of a realistic 
utopia because “we simply cannot confidently make the social scientific … judgments” about 
“how current efforts in the cause of justice will affect society over the long run,” but the only 
alternative he considers is to “accept whatever comparative gains in justice we can get or single-
mindedly attack some particular, salient injustice.”68 However, the fact that our epistemic situation 
rules out some long-range targets does not imply that our only choice is to always take the best 
short-term gains or to focus on specific injustices rather than taking a more future-oriented and 
holistic picture. The courses of action with the greatest expected justice may very well demand 
forgoing the most just and currently accessible improvements for the realization of more justice 
later on. In addition, these latter aims may be integrated and involve dealing with multiple 
injustices together. We should be careful, therefore, not to conflate guidance by ideal theory with 
judiciously seeking overall justice or the rejection of ideal theory with shortsightedness and 
 




myopia.69 On the contrary, it turns out that, in contemporary circumstances, doing our very best to 
progress toward integrated justice in the long run does not require ideal theory at all. 
1.9 Nonideal and Systematic Theory 
I have argued that the main justifications for the necessity of ideal theory are unsuccessful. 
We do not rely on ideal theory to justify first principles, priority rules, evaluative principles, fair 
burdens or the actions with the greatest expected justice in nonideal theory. In this final section, I 
will put forth a positive view about how we should develop a systematic nonideal theory based on 
why the previous dependence claims are mistaken. 
The first principles, priority rules, and evaluative principles theses are unsound because we 
can identify fundamental values and principles of justice and their priorities without specifically 
determining the principles of completely just arrangements. We can justify principles for nonideal 
theory both by testing which values and principles best explain why specific actions and states of 
affairs are unjust or rightful and by deducing the implications of more fundamental values and 
principles. Although considering specific cases may be indispensable in a holistic process of 
justification, there is no general reason why the case of perfect justice is necessary or has priority 
on inductive terms (except for the qualifications mentioned at the end of §5.) Indeed, since we are 
interested in principles for nonideal theory, it is most important and sufficient if they supply the 
right results in an adequate range of nonideal cases. In addition, we have not found any successful 
argument that ideal theory is necessary for more deductive explanations of the principles or facts 
that nonideal theory requires. Instead, we have seen that following ideal principles can lead to 
 
69 Contrast: “While some of us may become preoccupied with particular targeted injustices that seem to us especially 
grievous, none of us forgets that justice is an integrated goal and that activism in one domain has the potential to affect 
adversely the achievement of justice in another. This is all, really, on which Rawls’s model of the ideal-nonideal 




injustice in unjust circumstances and that we must go outside of ideal theory to justify principles 
to apply in nonideal theory. Moreover, we have learned that our strict compliance burdens and the 
prospect of achieving a realistic utopia are not important for nonideal theory. Overall, these 
considerations strongly support the view that it is often necessary, sufficient, and most important 
for a systematic nonideal theory to justify its principles based on the moral and non-moral features 
of unjust circumstances rather than the specific contours of perfect justice.70 
Furthermore, we can identify two ways in which nonideal theory must be realistic. First, 
the approximation fallacy means that nonideal theory must be sensitive to how some principles, 
institutions, policies, and actions may be required by justice only if other conditions are satisfied. 
Importantly, these concerns are not restricted to ideal theory and apply to more general and specific 
nonideal principles as well. For example, both the principles of equal concern and equal power 
may be constitutive of a society of equals,71 but we cannot assume that one should be pursued 
when the other is absent. It may be that power should not be more equally distributed if some do 
not have sufficient concern for their fellow citizens and would abuse their political influence. Or 
a citizen may not have a duty to show equal concern to another when the other does not adequately 
reciprocate.  Therefore, the justification of principles for nonideal theory should not abstract from, 
idealize, or make counterfactual assumptions about facts (a) that may affect the applicability of 
these principles and (b) that have a significant likelihood of not obtaining in our circumstances. 
 
70 I am counting more general facts that are part of both just and unjust situations (e.g. the existence of rational agents 
that grounds the contractualist requirement of mutual justification) as part of unjust circumstances. Notice that I do 
not say that ideal theory is completely irrelevant or useless. For example, it may still be part of or strengthen the 
justification of principles for nonideal theory, even if other premises would be sufficient. 





We will also want to know what it would take to fulfill the pre-conditions of salient principles of 
justice and the likelihood that they will be satisfied, if ever. Principles with infeasible or extremely 
unlikely prerequisites will not apply in nonideal theory or tell us how to respond to contemporary 
problems of injustice. 
Second, the evidential and probabilistic dimensions that formed the basis of the critique of 
the realistic utopia thesis are clearly important for nonideal theory in general. If our evidence and 
cognitive powers are not able to credibly discern the probability of any valuable social prospect 
conditional on our available actions, then that possibility cannot influence the expected justice of 
these actions or help determine which ones we should take. Furthermore, the very great value or 
justice of an outcome is not sufficient to establish that we have a duty to attempt its realization or 
make it more probable. Instead, our obligations depend on what our evidence says about both the 
values and the likelihoods of the consequences of pursuing different political targets. It follows 
that nonideal theory should not set forth social policies without comparing the expected justice of 
various options and being informed by existing moral and social-scientific evidence about the 
value and chances of their outcomes. 
As I will argue in chapters 2 and 3, neither of these points about how nonideal theory must 
be realistic are fully appreciated by some approaches that reject the claim that ideal theory is 
necessary. Therefore, in addition to defending the necessity, sufficiency and priority of justifying 
principles based on the facts of unjust circumstances, this chapter supports a distinctive approach 
to constructing a systematic theory of injustice that is more sensitive to the conditionality of 






Chapter 2: Pragmatism as Nonideal Methodology and Moral 
Epistemology 
Nonideal theory identifies the principles or duties of justice that apply in contemporary 
unjust circumstances. A nonideal methodology or moral epistemology is an account of the factors 
that are necessary or significant for justifying those requirements and of why they are required or 
important. In chapter 1, I examined the influential claim that ideal theory is necessary to identify 
some of the premises needed to justify certain obligations in nonideal theory. In this chapter, I will 
consider Elizabeth Anderson’s pragmatist nonideal methodology, which holds that we need not 
rely on ideal theory in moral justification (at least for some purposes).72  
Anderson rejects the influential notion that moral and political philosophy should justify a 
systematic set of fundamental and highly general principles that govern all or a great range of 
circumstances, including those very different from our own. She also challenges the reliability of 
a priori reasoning about cases that are distant from actual experience to establish these principles. 
Instead, Anderson argues that the vindication of normative judgments and principles depends on 
three things: (1) their capacity to solve the practical problems that we currently or will realistically 
face, (2) experiments in living in which the relevant views are put into practice such that their 
actual consequences and our moral intuitions in response to these consequences are revealed, and 
(3) in-depth empirical and causal analysis of our problems and their proposed solutions. In 
 
72 I do not think that Anderson successfully deflects or addresses all the main cases in support of the necessity of ideal 
theory. For example, her position is that “[f]iguring out how to address a just claim on our conduct now does not 
require knowing what system of principles would settle all ... claims” as in ideal theory. This is compatible with a 
need for ideal theory to realize a fully just society, and it does not respond to Simmons’s contention that ideal theory 
is required to know how to navigate conflicts between claims of justice. Nevertheless, since I have discussed these 
arguments in chapter 1, I will not look at Anderson’s views about ideal theory separately. Anderson, The Imperative 




addition, she holds (4) that we are not able to securely establish very general principles that apply 
to situations or problems substantially different from our more local concerns.  
Although Anderson discusses her pragmatism in several places, I will argue that central 
parts of her view and how they relate to one another are significantly unclear and that some are 
mistaken and need revision.73 My aim in this chapter is to defend a reconstructed pragmatist 
nonideal methodology that is centered on an experimental moral epistemology and that is more 
sensitive to the importance of unjust motivations and actions in moral justification. Sections 1-3 
will reconstruct and assess various aspects of Anderson’s pragmatism and how it is supposed to 
differ and be superior to other dominant approaches. Section 1 will consider Anderson’s claim that 
pragmatism’s conception of normative judgments as problem-solving tools means that it is only 
credible to justify principles to solve the practical problems we currently or will realistically 
encounter and that we can test our principles empirically. I will argue, in response, that the 
problem-solving function of normative judgments does not have either of these methodological 
implications. Instead I will contend in section 2, that the heart of Anderson’s pragmatism is its 
experimental or empiricist moral epistemology. In particular, I will examine her epistemological 
principle that, “[f]rom a pragmatist point of view, the ultimate test of any moral view lies in 
experiments in living” or in the implementation of a moral position in practice in order to gain 
actual experience of its practical consequences and testing these consequences and thereby the 
 
73 Anderson’s recent writing on pragmatism and moral epistemology include: Anderson, 3–7; “Dewey’s Moral 
Philosophy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2014, 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dewey-moral/; “Journeys of a Feminist Pragmatist,” Proceedings 
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 88 (2014): 71–87; “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices,” 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 89 (2015): 21–47; “Social Epistemology of 
Morality: Learning from the Forgotten History of the Abolition of Slavery,” in The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays 
in the Epistemology of Collectives (Oxford University Press, 2016), 75–94; “How to Be a Pragmatist,” in Oxford 




position against our moral intuitions.74 After considering her arguments, I will support the claims 
that experiments in living (a) can provide better evidence and deliver better justified moral 
judgments than a priori methods, (b) that the empirical evidence they supply is necessary for 
justification and (c) that their evidence can be part of a sufficient justification apart from a priori 
methods, if certain epistemological conditions are fulfilled. Section 3 will discuss how Anderson 
thinks nonideal theory must be empirically realistic and incorporate rigorous causal analysis of 
existing problems and their solutions. While I will concur with many aspects of Anderson’s stance, 
I will reject the idea that in justifying our duties we can discount the unwillingness of others to 
comply with requirements of justice. Instead, the unjust dispositions and actions of others are a 
necessary part of moral justification because they can affect agents’ abilities, the availability of 
morally permissible routes, the costs of compliance with alleged duties, and the probabilities of 
success and risks of various courses of action. Lastly, in section 4, I will consider Tommie Shelby’s 
objections that Anderson’s pragmatism suffers from a status quo bias and a blindspot to the unjust 
advantages of a social system and that it marginalizes the agency of the victims of injustice. I will 
show that Shelby’s objections do not, ultimately, apply to Anderson’s nonideal methodology. 
2.1 Pragmatism as Problem-Solving 
According to Anderson, “[d]ominant methods” in analytic moral and political philosophy 
“suppose that we can use intuitions and a priori reasoning to discover fundamental principles of 
morality that are systematic—that ground and unify our [practical] deliberations across all or at 
 




least large domains of conduct.”75 As we shall see, Anderson calls these a priori methods in the 
sense that they seek to justify moral judgments and principles independently of empirical evidence 
of their actual consequences in some of the circumstances they are meant to regulate (or in those 
that closely resemble them) and of our moral intuitions to those consequences. Empirical evidence 
is evidence that is obtained by actual experience or first-hand observation or by others’ testimony 
about their experiences. Hence, in contrast to a priori methods, empirical processes of justification 
adjudicate a moral view based on people’s experiences or observations of its actual consequences 
when it is realized in the circumstances it is expected to govern (or in those that closely resemble 
them) and of our moral intuitions to those consequences. These formulations of a priori and 
empirical methods represent two ends of a spectrum. Modes of justification can also be more or 
less a priori or empirical depending on the extent to which they involve people’s experiences of 
the actual consequences of a moral view and of their moral intuitions to them. 
An example of the dominant approach is “[t]he method of reflective equilibrium,” which 
holds that “a judgment is justified to a person if it is part of a coherent, reflectively stable system 
of belief she holds, including (a) intuitions about particular cases; (b) intuitions about general 
principles; and (c) various background scientific and ideal [or moral] theories, including theories 
of the person, of moral development and human motivation, of social order, rational choice, and 
so forth.”76 Each of these elements are used “to modify the others until we arrive at a set of 
 
75 For the most part, I will not assess the accuracy of Anderson’s characterization of the “dominant methods” but 
instead concentrate on reconstructing her positive view. Anderson, 2 emphasis added. 
76 Anderson, “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices,” 22; Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics, 2. print 




principles that accounts for our moral judgments in all particular cases.”77 As it is (or may seem to 
be) practiced in contemporary moral and political philosophy, this method is a priori because it 
justifies principles apart from empirical evidence of their actual consequences in some of the 
circumstances in which they apply. For example, Rawls uses reflective equilibrium to establish 
the principles of a just society.78 Even though he uses social scientific theories to predict the 
institutional and psychological ramifications of his principles, we do not and cannot have 
experience of or observe their actual consequences because we do not live in a society in which 
those principles are (nearly) realized.79 If his principles are to be understood as being successfully 
justified without such empirical evidence, then Rawls (or some of his followers) hold that 
reflective equilibrium is adequate as an a priori method.80 In addition, Rawls’s theory identifies 
(or is taken to identify) the first principles of justice for social institutions and individuals that are 
to guide not only current actions but also all our efforts up to the realization of complete 
distributive justice.81 To this extent, his theory is “illustrative of a common aspiration” in 
“contemporary moral philosophy … [that] is to seek fundamental principles of morality that could, 
 
77 Anderson, “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices,” 22. 
78 Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
79 This paragraph attempts to reconstruct Anderson’s view in a way that I think is more defensible. What she actually 
says about reflective equilibrium is: “Carried to its logical conclusion, this method can … lead to moral principles for 
all possible worlds, as long as we entertain thought experiments about sufficiently bizarre cases to elicit intuitions 
against which to modify our general principles.” I am doubtful that the internal logic of reflective equilibrium leads it 
to establish such principles or to consider such cases. Anderson, “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices,” 22. 
80 I hedge this statement because it may be objected that Rawls thinks the justification for his principles in ideal theory 
is provisional and that he agrees that empirical evidence is needed to adequately support them. This may be true. My 
only purpose for bringing up this possible interpretation of Rawls is to setup a contrast against which we can 
understand Anderson’s method and to suggest how she might see herself as differing from those who use reflective 
equilibrium. 




in principle, settle all moral problems (at least of a particular structure—e.g., regarding saving 
lives, or distributing goods) in all [or a broad range of] circumstances.”82 
In contrast, “[p]ragmatist methods have more modest objectives” in that “they seek no 
more generality in normative principles than is required for the resolution of moral problems that 
we are (or realistically risk) confronting … They also stress that practical principles are [to be] 
tested empirically, in practice.”83 For example, Anderson supplies “a contextualized rationale” for 
“certain antidiscrimination norms of limited scope … as useful tools for dismantling existing 
systematic group-based disadvantage,” instead of justifying principles “by seeking some key 
feature that makes an act of discrimination, considered in isolation, inherently wrong.”84 In this 
and the next section, my goal is to understand and assess the pragmatist case for (1) only justifying 
the moral judgments or principles needed to resolve the moral problems we do or may realistically 
encounter and for (2) the importance of empirical processes of justification, which Anderson holds 
are the primary features that distinguish pragmatism from mainstream methodologies. Although 
Anderson’s pragmatism may have additional components (e.g. meta-ethical commitments) that set 
it apart from other approaches, I will only be interested in these parts of her view insofar as they 
are supposed to support the above two dimensions of pragmatist moral epistemology. 
 
82 Rawls’s remarks about the “full conception of right” or “the full system of principles that would be chosen in the 
original position” and its “completeness” are relevant here. However, Rawls admits that he is not sure whether 
constructing a complete system of moral principles is feasible. For example, regarding how principles for individuals 
should be prioritized, he says that “I do not know how this problem is to be settled, or even whether a systematic 
solution formulating useful and practicable rules is possible.” Anderson, “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices,” 22; 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 298–301. 
83 Anderson, “How to Be a Pragmatist,” 3. 




“The key to understanding pragmatist methods,” Anderson says, “is to consider the 
instrumental value of [normative and evaluative] judgments. We use them to guide our conduct 
and valuations of things. We formulate them in order to solve practical problems: to figure out 
what we should do, when we are uncertain about how to proceed but need to act; to change the 
ways we value certain things, when our current valuations have gotten us into trouble, or to figure 
out how to value a novel object.”85 Thus, Anderson follows John Dewey is conceiving these 
judgments as tools whose success, rightness or truth consists in whether using them as guides for 
belief, feelings, or action would satisfy our (sound) intellectual, evaluative, and normative aims.86 
According to this perspective, part of the truth and adequacy of a normative view is whether it 
should be believed and used by a person as a guide to action.87 For this reason, it is incompatible 
with the view that the sole purpose of a normative theory is to provide a theoretical account of 
right or good and wrong or bad action. On this latter account, it is possible, as Derek Parfit argues, 
that the true normative theory is “self-effacing” or should not be believed in order that people bring 
 
85 Anderson, “How to Be a Pragmatist,” 6. 
86 Dewey: “Any belief as such is tentative, hypothetical: it … is framed with reference to its office as a guide to action 
… it is apprehended as a tool and only a tool, an instrumentality of direction.” What does this practical function of 
beliefs amount to? Does it exclude wanting to understand for itself? Philip Kitcher maintains that Dewey “[n]ever 
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about the results it holds are right or desirable.88 In contrast, pragmatists reject “driv[ing] a sharp 
wedge between the truth and usefulness of [evaluative and normative] judgments.”89  
One kind of concern that judgments are meant to address are called “problems,” which I 
propose we may generally characterize as those features of states of affairs, actions, or beliefs that 
someone should or that it would be better to remove, alleviate or change. For nonideal theory, the 
central problems are to justify and discern what are our duties of justice in particular unjust 
circumstances and to comply with them if we are not. In addition, nonideal theory seeks to identify 
unjust conduct and states of affairs, which are problems in the sense that have prima facie (if not 
conclusive) duties to remove them. Insofar as the function of a judgment or view is to solve a 
certain problem, it is subject to a “contextualist” and “problem-centered” moral epistemology, in 
which its “standards of success are defined contextually, in terms of the problem to be solved.”90 
Hence, “[t]he test of a [normative] judgment – whether it ‘works’ – is whether [applying it would] 
successfully identif[y] an action” that would “solve[] the problem encountered in this situation.”91 
Although treating moral views as problem-solving tools is illuminating, I do not think that 
it means (1) that we should only justify judgments or principles for the moral problems we 
currently or may realistically face or (2) that empirical methods are significant or even available. 
First, let us investigate the notion of a “problem.” A problem is not simply anything that existing 
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people feel or believe ought to be or it would be better to eliminate, lessen, or alter. Anderson is 
committed to a distinction between genuine problems and what people sense or take to be 
problems. For instance, she says that we can discover that we “misconceived the problem [and] 
that our proposed solution was confused or incoherent,” which implies that the nature of a problem 
and its solution is independent from what we happen to believe about them.92 Furthermore, she 
holds that “the articulation of problems is dependent on [the normative content] of [moral] ideals,” 
values, or principles that explain why problems are wrong or undesirable and how to respond to 
them.93 For example, Anderson’s argument for racial integration as an imperative of justice uses a 
contractualist framework and several principles of social equality to explain and to identify unjust 
actions, distributions and states of affairs and our responsibilities to ameliorate them.94 In this 
respect, her method is not different than that of many theories of justice that seek to establish moral 
values and principles in order to discern unjust conduct and conditions and to serve as practical 
guides that tell us what our obligations in relation to injustices are. Moreover, in principle, we 
could have a universal principle or set of principles which provides people with an answer about 
how to act in every circumstances. Act-utilitarianism is a theory of this form.95 Therefore, that 
moral judgments and principles are problem-solving devices does not mean that we have to restrict 
ourselves to justifying principles for the moral problems that we actually or may realistically 
 
92 Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 7; Cf. Anderson, “Dewey’s Moral Philosophy,” sec. 2.5; Anderson, “How 
to Be a Pragmatist,” 18. 
93 Elizabeth Anderson, “Reply to Critics of The Imperative of Integration,” Political Studies Review 12, no. 3 (2014): 
378. 
94 Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 16–22, 67–134. 




confront. It is entirely compatible with the problem-solving function of moral views to adopt the 
ambition that Anderson attributes to the dominant approaches in moral and political philosophy 
and be interested in finding highly general principles that solve all moral problems or all those in 
a very wide range of circumstances. 
Nevertheless, Anderson argues that “[o]nce we view [normative] judgments as problem-
solving tools, we have … reason to doubt the aspiration of the dominant methods of normative 
philosophy.96 Given that the specific characteristics of moral problems “are rooted in empirical 
[i.e. non-normative or descriptive] realities that differ across societies and ages, there is no 
particular reason to think that there is any single [set of] fundamental moral tool[s] that would 
settle all our [problems], or even all [problems] of a particular structure, everywhere. That is no 
more plausible than to suppose that there is one ultimate tool that will perform every task needed 
to build a shelter, no matter the climate, economic, and social conditions.”97 Unfortunately, this 
reasoning is unpersuasive because it may be that we can explain the moral significance of the non-
normative facts and the specific moral problems of a broad range of circumstances in terms of 
more fundamental values or principles. If we are able to do this, then we would have moral 
principles that could serve as practical guides in all these situations even though their application 
may vary significantly depending on the particular facts of each case. It may be that we cannot 
justify such fundamental and general principles for other reasons. The current point is that the 
position that moral judgments are for problem-solving and the non-normative and moral variety 
of different circumstances does not imply that we cannot. In addition, even if it is true that are no 
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highly general moral principles, this does not mean that we could not identify different values and 
principles for various circumstances separately, including those very dissimilar to our own. Hence, 
we would need additional support, apart from the lack of highly general principles, to secure the 
claim that we should justify moral views exclusively for the moral problems we currently or may 
realistically face.  
Anderson also contends that “[b]ecause we use [normative and evaluative] judgments to 
solve practical problems, such judgments are subject to empirical testing: we can see whether these 
judgments actually help us solve the problem we are using them to solve. Practical judgments or 
policies imply hypotheticals of (roughly) the form: ‘adhering to principle x (in conduct or 
deliberation) will help solve or ameliorate problem y.’ If such hypotheticals fail when [the 
principles are implemented and] tested in their expected contexts, we can [know the judgment is 
mistaken and] investigate what went wrong with our judgment-forming process.”98 Hence, it may 
be suggested that the instrumental value of moral views for solving problems means that we can 
(and should) empirically assess them. 
We will discuss how moral judgments are empirically tested in detail in the next section. 
For now it is sufficient to recall that empirical methods are based on empirical evidence of a moral 
view’s actual consequences and of people’s moral intuitions to them, which is made available by 
realizing the view in the circumstances to which it applies. Based on this characterization, we can 
see that the problem-solving role of moral judgments does not imply that we can use empirical 
processes to test them. If we want to justify principles that regulate all circumstances or situations 
very different from our own, then it will not be possible to implement them and gain empirical 
 




evidence of their consequences or people’s intuitions to them in all the contexts the principles are 
meant to govern. The best we would be able to do is to construct theoretical models that predict 
the consequences of these principles in different situations and to use people’s moral intuitions in 
response to those projected consequences. We have not yet been given adequate reason to think 
that these types of principles could not be justified. Moreover, even for moral judgments we are 
able to empirically assess, we still need to know why empirical methods are important or better in 
comparison to a priori modes of justification. I will examine these issues shortly. The main 
conclusion of this section is that, contrary to what Anderson says, it does not seem that “[t]he key 
to understanding pragmatist methods” and how they differ from dominant approaches “is the 
instrumental value of [moral] judgments” for solving moral problems.99 Pragmatism needs other 
grounds to only justify principles for the moral concerns we are or realistically risk encountering 
and to emphasize the significance of empirical testing.  
2.2 Pragmatism and Experiments in Living 
In my view, the heart of Anderson’s pragmatism is the importance it gives to certain 
experimental or empiricist processes of justification. The central pragmatist method for justifying 
or improving our moral judgments are experiments in living, in which “[w]e test our judgments by 
living in accordance with them and seeing whether they solve the problem we are trying to solve, 
with acceptable side-effects.”100 Anderson states that “[f]rom a pragmatist point of view, the 
ultimate test of any moral view lies in experiments in living.”101 We can distinguish several ways 
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in which experiments in living are meant to be the “ultimate test.” For example, she says that 
experiments in living (a) supply “more accurate information” than a priori reasoning, (b) that the 
“vindication of any ideal must be found in the experiences of those who live according to it – not 
in a priori argument,” and that experiments in living (c) can secure “vindication.”102 In this section, 
I will defend reconstructed versions of these three claims that Anderson makes about experiments 
in living.  I will also argue that the significance of these claims for our actual practice of moral 
justification is limited because of the difficulty or impermissibility of conducting experiments in 
living. 
Anderson contrasts experiments in living to certain a priori modes of justification that she 
says dominant approaches rely upon. As I have mentioned, these methods are a priori insofar as 
they do not justify a moral view based on empirical evidence of its actual consequences in the 
circumstances that it is supposed to govern (or in very similar situations) and of people’s intuitions 
to those consequences. First, there is a priori “[d]eliberation,” which “is a kind of thought 
experiment undertaken by an agent who … entertains various courses of action, imagines the 
expected consequences of those actions, and simulates her normative reactions [or intuitions] to 
these actions and their consequences … with the intention to act as her normative intuitions 
direct.”103 Normative or evaluative “intuitions” are “feelings or ideas about what one ought to do, 
or how one ought to feel, or what is a reason for or against doing or feeling something.”104 These 
intuitions, feelings, or experiences are not beliefs or judgments and they do not always coincide 
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with our beliefs—“it is quite possible to judge one way about what is good [or right], but to feel 
quite differently about it.”105 As stated, this is an overly narrow conception of deliberation because 
it does not include any role for explicit reasoning, conceptual clarification or innovation, or highly 
developed scientific or moral theories. However, Anderson means to cover “the most thoughtful 
deliberation” and we have seen that reflective equilibrium is a paradigm of the prevailing methods, 
so let us assume that she means to encompass all of these elements as well.106 Second, there are a 
priori philosophical “thought experiments such as the famous trolley cases” that similarly 
“forecast the consequences of various actions” and “elicit intuitions [but] without any intention to 
act as they direct…. Moreover, they are further removed from experience than ordinary 
deliberation. To ensure that principles arrived at could be true in all possible worlds [or in a very 
wide range of cases], the dominant philosophical methodology dictates that we entertain thought 
experiments about bizarre [or very unfamiliar] cases distant from prior experience, and work up 
principles that can encompass all our intuitions for all [these] cases.”107  
The problem with a priori methods is that we know from historical experience that even at 
their best, they are often mistaken. “No one supposes,” Anderson says, “that actual [a priori] 
deliberation [reliably] leads to non-trivial necessary [or highly general] truths. Often enough, even 
when we act on the most thoughtful deliberation, we end up doing something we regret.”108 
Moreover, “[i]ntuitions elicited in philosophical thought experiments … can hardly be more 
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reliable than actual deliberation. It is subject to the same [and worse] errors.”109 There are two 
main sources of error. First, for circumstances substantially different than those we understand 
through experience, it is very difficult reliably to predict the non-normative or descriptive 
consequences of our actions or of moral judgments and principles. This is especially the case when 
we are theorizing about complex social systems with numerous causal relations that are hard to 
model with much accuracy as we consider states of affairs increasingly remote from those in the 
present and past that we understand well. Therefore, even if a certain course of action or principle 
seems correct after a priori reflection, we may very well discover that it is wrong because we failed 
to accurately predict its descriptive consequences. Second, for states of affairs distant from those 
with which we have experience, our predictions about our moral intuitions are inaccurate. “[W]e 
are not very good,” Anderson argues, “at forecasting our feelings about not-yet-experienced states 
… The history of politics is littered with attempts to realize imagined utopias that turned out badly, 
not just because of unforeseen consequences, but because anticipated consequences that peopled 
imagined would be wonderful were experienced as horrible in real life.”110 The assumption seems 
to be that certain moral intuitions we have in response to actually experiencing the consequences 
of our actions or views are much more sensitive to their moral features and implications than the 
intuitions we have a priori, which are often seriously mistaken. Hence, moral intuitions formed 
apart from the input of direct experience of the consequences of our actions or judgments are 
unreliable guides to right action. These ideas establish Anderson’s primary critical position, which 
I express as follows: 
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Inadequacy of the A Priori: A priori methods are inadequate for justifying moral judgments 
and principles because they are not based on empirical evidence of the descriptive and 
normative consequences of realizing those judgments or principles in some of the 
circumstances they are meant to regulate. 
 
The insufficiency of a priori modes of justification is an important part of Anderson’s view 
because it means that more empirical processes may be necessary. If a priori reflection were 
adequate, then we would not need empirical methods, even if the evidence they supply is helpful 
or superior. While it may be that we should still seek out and use such empirical data, Anderson’s 
pragmatism would not contain as deep of a critique of a priori approaches. Importantly, however, 
her criticism presupposes the reliability of certain sources of empirical evidence, which show that 
the non-normative and normative deliverances of a priori methods are inaccurate. So we need to 
take a closer look at the primary method she favors, experiments in living, to understand her 
negative and positive epistemological views. 
I propose that we start with a relatively minimal characterization of experiments in living: 
 
Experiments in Living: Processes or states of affairs in which a moral view is or was 
realized such that, in principle, we can obtain empirical evidence about its actual 
consequences (e.g. the actions it entails and their effects) and people’s moral intuitions in 





This formulation is different than the one Anderson gives in some places because it does not state 
that or how we “test” or assess a moral view in or based on experiments in living. Since this will 
be a central issue in what follows, it is better to start with a conception of experiments in living 
that does not specify the way in which a moral view is adjudicated. In addition, my formulation 
does not require that someone intentionally experiment and “put into practice” or “live in 
accordance with” a moral judgment or principle in order to discover its consequences and how we 
morally respond to them.111 It is enough that a certain moral view is implemented such that we can 
have empirical evidence of its actual consequences and of people’s moral intuitions to them. For 
example, Anderson describes black Americans in “[t]he Civil Rights Movement [as] put[ting] the 
value judgments and practical precepts of white[] [Americans] regarding … their supremacy over 
black[] [people], conceived as an alien and inferior race … to the test in [the] Birmingham 
[demonstrations] in 1963 … teaching white[] [Americans] that they would no longer put up with 
such treatment.”112 The view that white people are superior to black people was realized in the 
institutions and the social fabric of the United States, but this was not done in order to assess its 
validity. Nevertheless, that racist perspective was part of an experiment in living in the above sense 
because it was socially realized with the result that people had direct experience of its practical 
consequences and of people’s moral intuitions to them, especially black protestors’ strong moral 
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feelings and convictions against institutionalized white supremacy.113 With these remarks in the 
background, let us turn to what Anderson says about the merits of experiments in living. 
“Conclusions drawn from actual experiments in living,” according to Anderson, “are more 
reliable than those drawn from [a priori] deliberation or … [a priori] philosophical thought 
experiments, because they are based on more accurate information—about the actual 
consequences of actions, and our actual normative reactions [i.e. intuitions] to those actions and 
their consequences.”114 It is not clear exactly how Anderson conceives conclusions being “drawn 
from” experiments in living. Sometimes she seems to describe people’s intuitions to the actual 
consequences of a moral view as being the final standard of assessment just as the observable 
events of the natural world are for scientific hypotheses. 
 
We test scientific hypotheses by bringing about their antecedents and seeing if the results 
are as they predicted. Similarly, we test value judgments by acting on them and seeing if 
we value the consequences in the way the judgment predicted. Acting on our value 
judgments — putting them into practice — supplies the data for confirming or 
disconfirming them. Roughly speaking, a value judgment hypothesizes “try it, you’ll like 
it [or feel that it is right]” — a statement easily subject to empirical verification and 
refutation.115 
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This passage suggests the claim that moral judgments formed on the basis of empirical evidence 
made available by experiments in living are better justified than those generated by a priori 
methods because (a) we are able directly to observe the actual non-normative or descriptive 
consequences of a moral view and (b) people’s moral intuitions to those consequences are reliable 
indicators of the relevant moral considerations and the view’s validity. Although I think 
Anderson’s considered position is much more sophisticated, I will examine this claim because its 
shortcomings are instructive. 
The above conception of how experiments in living lead to better justified moral views is 
far too simple and significantly belies the complexity of making justified moral judgments based 
on descriptive and moral empirical data. For example, in the physical and social sciences, the 
accuracy of empirical evidence is dependent on the processes by which it is gained. Interview and 
survey questions may be poorly designed so that their answers do not accurately reflect people’s 
beliefs or their sense of how their interests are affected by various social policies and enacted moral 
views. Conversely, respondents may be prone to self-deception or to deceiving their questioners 
providing the answers that they think match others’ desires or public opinion rather than what 
really portrays their perspective or moral feelings. In addition, even if the basic empirical 
information is sound, it may not lead to true or justified descriptive generalizations if our reasoning 
is defective. More fundamentally, descriptive hypotheses and claims are underdetermined by 
available empirical data, and the construction of descriptive theories is guided by non-empirical 




consistent with or will allow us to conserve existing beliefs.116 Hence, the descriptive implications 
we draw from the empirical data supplied by experiments in living will depend on the weight we 
give to these values and the purposes we hope the theory will serve.117 The significance of the 
underdetermination of descriptive views by empirical evidence can be seen in that how we interpret 
available empirical data can be affected by the descriptive and moral theories we hold and their 
deficiencies. For example, whether observers count certain phenomena as relevant or analyze them 
as belonging to certain kinds often depends on their background conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks. Even a seemingly simple matter such as identifying what counts as a moral intuition 
is implicated in disagreements between Kantian and non-Kantians on the moral status of 
emotions.118 Likewise, Anderson argues that the concepts of “racism” and “racial discrimination” 
are too crude to capture all the morally significant kinds of racial injustices and to enable us to 
make the moral evaluations that are appropriate to each of them.119 Therefore, our existing 
descriptive and moral beliefs and accepting theories that are consistent with them or that enable us 
to maximize their conservation may prevent us from properly understanding available empirical 
evidence and lead us to draw false beliefs. Since empirical evidence and the processes by which it 
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is interpreted and inferences are drawn from it can be inaccurate, theoretically myopic, and 
mistaken in these ways, it is not true that moral judgments made using empirical evidence of the 
actual descriptive consequences of a moral view are always better justified than the conclusions of 
a priori processes. 
Similar complexities apply to people’s moral intuitions in response to the actual 
consequences of a moral view. These intuitions are important because they are meant to be superior 
pieces of moral “evidence of the presence of values and reasons” or of the “normative 
considerations” relevant to assessing a moral view than our a priori intuitions.120 It is clear that 
intuitions disclosed by experiments in living can be more reliable because they might be 
responding to better descriptive information and they may be sensitive to certain moral values or 
reasons that were not palpable in abstract reflection. However, it is not true that all our intuitions 
to the actual consequences of a moral view are more credible than their a priori counterparts. For 
example, suppose that experiments in living reveal that the actual consequences of a principle of 
justice include a much higher than anticipated tax rate for oneself or one’s identity group. This 
knowledge might trigger certain biases of self- or group-interest that distort our moral intuitions 
about the acceptability of the principle and may even interfere with a proper descriptive 
understanding of the relevant social scientific facts leading to ideological interpretations or 
irrational disbelief. In this case, it may be that a priori or less empirically informed intuitions may 
generate better justified judgments because they would not activate these cognitive biases that 
inhibit us from appreciating the import of certain moral and descriptive facts.121 Moreover, 
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intuitions that are genuinely responsive to moral considerations may not lead to better justified 
judgments because we may not correctly weigh them against conflicting intuitions or reason poorly 
about their moral implications. Furthermore, as with descriptive hypotheses, moral claims and 
theories are underdetermined by available empirical evidence such as moral intuitions and 
choosing which moral view to accept is affected by other criteria such as consistency with and the 
conservation of existing beliefs. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, we may have 
erroneous or conceptually myopic moral and social scientific theories about which phenomena are 
morally relevant and their natures. This can lead us to discount (or include) some phenomena as 
significant which we should not and to conflate different kinds of things that should be 
distinguished. Unconsciously or upon reflection, these false or confused beliefs may override 
veridical intuitions or cause us to have moral feelings that are disproportionate to the (dis)value of 
certain wrongful, innocent, or just actions or states of affairs. For example, luck and relational 
egalitarians have different conceptions about when inequalities in social goods or well-being are 
unjust, and these may influence their moral intuitions and which ones they accept. For all these 
reasons, it is false that moral judgments reached on the basis of people’s moral intuitions to the 
actual consequences of a moral view are guaranteed to be better justified than the deliverances of 
a priori methods. 
What my analysis shows is that the absolute and relative credibility of moral judgments 
that are formed on the basis of empirical evidence are dependent on several epistemological 
conditions regarding whether the evidence is accurate and whether we adequately recognize its 
 
conclusions. From a pragmatist point of view, the ultimate test of any moral view lies in experiments in living.” In 
contrast, my argument demonstrates that experiments in living require a certain lack of bias in order to be a successful 
method. Anderson, 16; Anderson, “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices”; Anderson, “Social Epistemology of 




significance and implications. This means that we have to adopt a more nuanced perspective on 
the relationship between experiments in living and moral justification. Instead of the claim that 
conclusions using the empirical evidence of experiments of living are better justified than those 
formed through a priori methods, I propose the following more modest principles.  
 
Experimental Availability: The realization of a moral view in experiments in living makes 
certain descriptive and normative facts salient to the view’s justification empirically 
available, though this does not imply that such facts or their implications will be properly 
appreciated (e.g. by our moral intuitions) and lead to better justification. 
 
Experimental Credibility: Moral judgments made on the basis of the empirical evidence 
provided by experiments in living are better justified than the deliverances of a priori 
methods alone if the evidence is sufficiently accurate and its implications are adequately 
recognized. 
 
In addition, from the facts that a priori methods are inadequate, that experiments in living are the 
only other source of evidence, and that we require evidence, we have: 
 
Experimental Necessity: Experiments in living of moral views and the empirical evidence 
they supply are necessary for the justification of those views.122 
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A more challenging matter is to identify how experiments in living relate to sufficient 
justification. So far the discussion indicates that adequate justification of a moral view for an agent 
involves empirical evidence provided by experiments in living, that such evidence is sufficiently 
accurate, and that its implications are adequately recognized. Furthermore, similar to the physical 
and social sciences, a single experiment in living may not be enough to establish the descriptive 
or normative consequences of a moral judgment or to provide sufficient inductive support for 
moral justification.123 Hence, we also require a satisfactory number of properly conducted 
experimental tests, which are diverse enough to test for different experimental variables. The above 
epistemological desiderata are expressed in Anderson’s example of the evaluative expertise of a 
connoisseur, even though it is not about moral judgment: “The novice and the connoisseur may 
both value (like) the same object. But the latter has a reflective and articulate grasp of the features 
of the object that are liked, plus enough experience with valuations of objects of that type to have 
warranted confidence that these features merit liking. That is, the connoisseur has enough 
experience to warrant confidence that there are not further features of the object or consequences 
of valuing it which, once appreciated, would reverse or detract from the liking.”124 
However, we still have to incorporate the above conditions about experiments in living into 
a larger account of moral justification. This is because, as Anderson says, “[e]vidence is always 
defeasible,” and we can “rationally dismiss” the empirical evidence (e.g. people’s moral intuitions) 
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as the result of our justified “reflective judgments.”125 According to Anderson “judgments [are] … 
justified and objective when they are reflectively endorsable from a common point of view in [a 
certain kind of] normative discussion.”126 As this statement indicates, her conception of moral 
justification and objectivity contains constructivist elements, which I cannot discuss here. 
However, the features of the relevant normative discussion are largely epistemological values that 
find widespread acceptance. For example, the discussion identifies the appropriate moral standards 
because it eliminates or minimizes “defects such as inconsistency, ignorance, partiality, confusion, 
double standards, insensitivity, or pragmatic self-defeat.”127 In addition, parties to the justificatory 
process are to be appropriately responsive to the views and “intuitions of more experienced, wise, 
reflective, and virtuous people” in order to correct those of her “attitudes” that may be “poorly 
developed as a result of inexperience, defective character, neuroses, or other problems.”128 The 
main point that we need to keep in mind for our purposes is that the empirical evidence provided 
by experiments in living about a moral view will be part of an adequate justification for that view 
only if it is justified by a larger process of justification with epistemological virtues like these. 
Nevertheless, our discussion enriches our general understanding of moral justification by showing 
that experiments in living have a necessary and important place in justifying moral views. 
In addition, we can also say that if we have a satisfactory and accurate pool of empirical 
evidence about a moral view from multiple and diverse experiments in living, we sufficiently 
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recognize the implications of that evidence, and the other conditions of sound reasoning are 
fulfilled, then we would not need additional inductive support from a priori methods in order to 
justify (or disqualify) that view. While Anderson may not explicitly state that a priori reasoning 
can be unnecessary, she seems committed to that claim when she holds that certain experiments in 
living secure “vindication” for certain moral views.129 Hence, we can express another principle of 
Anderson’s pragmatism as follows: 
 
Experimental Adequacy: A satisfactory amount of diverse and properly implemented 
experiments in living of a moral view can supply enough empirical evidence to justify (or 
undermine) that view for an agent apart from a priori reflection, if that evidence is 
sufficiently accurate, she adequately recognizes its implications, and her reasoning meets 
other epistemological conditions conducive to making sound judgments. 
 
I hope that the various principles that I have reconstructed about experiments in living and 
moral justification accurately represent important parts of Anderson’s pragmatism in their best 
form. I would like to close this section by reflecting on their wider relevance for moral and political 
philosophy and on how they relate to pragmatism’s focus on our current problems or those we may 
realistically face. Although I find the principles about the inadequacy of a priori methods and the 
necessity and adequacy of experiments in living and their reasoning persuasive, they also reveal 
certain limits to our powers of moral justification. The reason is that it is often not feasible or 
morally permissible to rigorously test moral judgments in experiments in living by putting them 
 




into practice even in present circumstances. This is especially the case for social or political 
principles, which have extensive practical consequences, are costly to implement and require the 
cooperation of many individuals and institutions. I am not suggesting that we can never have 
enough experimental data for justification (e.g. as Anderson argues that we do for justifying an 
imperative of racial integration). However, to the significant extent that we do not, it follows from 
pragmatist moral epistemology that we are not able to justify the relevant principles. When the 
empirical evidence that we have is lacking, we have no choice but to follow the moral views or 
principles that are best supported by all the available evidence and sound reflection.  
Therefore, it is the principle of experimental credibility, which says that our judgments are 
better justified if they are based on the empirical evidence provided by experiments in living (if 
that evidence is accurate and its implications are adequately taken into account) that is often the 
most practically relevant to our actual efforts in figuring out which course of action to take or 
which view or principle to realize. This principle entails that we should use and seek out more of 
the empirical evidence of experiments in living (if possible, permissible and sufficiently likely to 
be effective and valuable), even if what we have or can obtain is not enough for justification. 
Similarly, deficits of empirical evidence mean that there may still be a substantial role for a priori 
methods, such as thought experiments, in our moral reasoning, as long as they are not about 
situations too drastically different from what we know. As long as our a priori theoretical 
extrapolations in social science and moral and political philosophy are not equally or less reliable 
than not reasoning at all or flipping a coin, then it may be best to follow their guidance to make up 




The experimental moral epistemology of pragmatism also partially supports a restriction 
to justifying principles for “moral problems that we are (or realistically risk) confronting.”130 It is 
more plausible to think that we can establish principles for solving these problems because they 
are the ones we are best able to justify using experiments in living conducted in our own 
circumstances or those similar to them. In contrast, we cannot observe the outcomes of 
experiments in living of a moral view that is meant to regulate very different circumstances 
because we are not able to apply that view in the relevant situations or in those that closely 
resemble them.  
Notice, however, that the basis of the restriction to justifying principles for contemporary 
circumstances is entirely evidential and that in principle, we can have enough empirical evidence 
to establish principles for problems that are not or will not realistically become ours. For example, 
there may be problems that we have solved in the past and are very unlikely to encounter again. 
Yet, there may be nothing epistemologically amiss about justifying principles to remove those 
problems because we have sufficient evidence from past experiments in living and the testimony 
of others. Likewise, there may be problems that would exist in situations that are only modestly 
different than those we have encountered and understand but which are nevertheless quite 
improbable. In such cases, the empirical evidence we do have may be sufficient to justify moral 
judgments or principles for these unlikely problems and these conclusions may have enough 
epistemological merit to be incorporated into our reasoning about problems we do or are likely to 
encounter.  
 




Moreover, as I argued above, we may lack adequate empirical evidence to justify a solution 
to our problems and the best way for us to decide which course of action or moral view to realize 
may involve the using a priori methods. For these reasons, pragmatism’s empiricist epistemology 
entails that, given other epistemological conditions, the solutions to contemporary problems that 
we identify by experiments in living enjoy more justificatory weight than those drawn from a 
priori methods alone, but it does not imply that we cannot justify principles for solving problems 
that are not or will not realistically become ours or that we can dispense with a priori methods in 
moral justification. 
2.3 Empirical Realism and Unjust Dispositions and Conduct 
Another “central methodological theme” of Anderson’s pragmatism is the claim that 
“social and political philosophy needs to be grounded in an empirically adequate understanding of 
the problems we face and the effects of proposed solutions to these problems.”131 First, she argues 
that “we need to tailor our principles to the motivational and cognitive capacities of human 
beings.”132 On the one hand, this expresses the condition that requirements or principles of justice 
are valid only if they are within the abilities of the agent. “Valid claims of justice,” Anderson says, 
“must be addressed to agents who are in a position to make things right—or at least better. If what 
is demanded of them is impossible, then the claim is invalid.”133 For example, she cautions that 
“[p]olitical philosophy should … construct remedies that are attentive to empirical constraints, 
including the limitations of human psychology. We are not nearly as rational, self-aware, and self-
 
131 Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 180. 
132 Anderson, 3. 




controlled as we imagine ourselves to be. Normative recommendations must take these limitations 
into account, lest they prescribe standards that are impossible for people to meet.”134 On the other 
hand, it means that actual human beings’ motivations and cognitive processes, “with all our 
limitations and flaws,” are facts that nonideal theory needs to take into account in order to discover 
how to achieve a more just world.135 “Just institutions,” for example, “must be designed to block, 
work around, or cancel out our motivational and cognitive deficiencies, to harness our nonmoral 
motives to moral ends, to make up for each other’s limitations by pooling our knowledge and 
wills.”136 Second, Anderson maintains that we require “a detailed empirical investigation of the 
underlying causes of [our problems] … [in order to avoid] missing out on more fundamental and 
complex diagnoses … and hence [to avoid] missing out on genuine solutions.”137 For example, it 
is inadequate to bypass these in-depth empirical studies and to suppose that we can fix our 
problems by minimizing the differences between an ideal society and ours. She argues that even 
if a multiculturalist vision of a just society in which some racial groups live in segregated 
communities without being unjustly disadvantaged is true, that does not mean that we can fix 
existing racial injustice by maintaining segregation and moving resources to people. It may be that 
entering relationships with the members of more advantaged racial groups is necessary to correct 
unjust inequalities and that those relationships can only be formed to the extent required through 
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racial integration.138 In addition, to understand our problems we may “need to draw distinctions—
for instance, among racial stereotyping, racism, and racial injustice …, among different racial 
concepts …, and among different types of discrimination ‘on the basis of race,’ … [which would 
mean that] we must reconsider whether the evaluations we adopted toward phenomena falling 
under the incoherently lumpy concepts (e.g., ‘racism’ and ‘racial discrimination’) make any sense 
as applied to the newly distinguished phenomena.”139 Third, we need to consider how burdensome 
various ways of realizing the solutions to our problems are and whether they are too costly for 
some people to be required by justice. Anderson states that her argument in support of racial 
integration is not “unrealistic” in that it does not violate any of these requirements of nonideal 
theory: “[M]y integrationist theory … does not prescribe normative standards that are impossible 
or unreasonably difficult for people to meet, nor standards that fail to serve their objectives.”140 
I accept these three requirements of empirical realism. However, there is a way in which 
nonideal theory should be realistic that Anderson mistakenly rejects or does not recognize. The 
issue is the significance, if any, of the wrongful or unjust dispositions or actions of other agents 
and of ourselves for justifying duties of justice. Anderson recognizes this concern when she 
concedes that governmental policies for racially integrating public schools, which in her view are 
necessary to correct injustice, are “not politically feasible” because of unjustly motivated “massive 
white resistance.”141 “This,” she says, “raises the question of what sort of realism is demanded in 
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political philosophy.”142 While she accepts the three kinds of realism we have already canvassed, 
she rejects the idea that “a sound political philosophy must be realistic in another sense: that it 
must accommodate people’s unwillingness to meet certain standards of justice … [N]o one 
supposes that moral philosophy should be realistic in this sense: people’s refusal to do what 
morality requires does not generate a valid claim on their part to be let off the moral hook. Why 
should matters be any different in normative political philosophy?”143 
Anderson is correct that a moral agent’s (e.g. a person, the state, an institutional agent) 
unwillingness to comply with a certain requirement of morality or justice does not mean that she 
does not have that duty. However, there are other ways in which unjust motivations and actions 
are significant for identifying agents’ duties of justice in nonideal theory. First, we have to take 
into account the unjust dispositions and conduct of other agents. Although it is true that a person’s 
unwillingness to perform an obligation does not cancel it, other people’s lack of motivation to 
fulfill their obligations may very well mean that she does not have certain duties or that she has 
additional or even stronger obligations.144 This is because other agents’ wrongful motives and 
actions can affect several factors that determine what duties an agent possesses. For example, some 
courses of action or social policies are (a) feasible, (b) morally permissible, and (c) effective at 
promoting moral ends only if other agents contribute to them as well. In addition, the unjust 
dispositions and conduct of other agents can make (d) the burdens of performing certain actions 
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unreasonable as well as (e) lessen the probability that they will advance justice and (f) increase the 
risks that they will exacerbate injustice. Even if a specific policy would advance justice more than 
all others if it succeeds, we may have greater reason to attempt an alternative because the 
probabilities of realizing more just outcomes or of avoiding unjust consequences are too low. For 
all these reasons, nonideal theory must consider the unjust motivations and actions of other agents 
in justifying duties of justice.145 While Anderson’s position is not that “political philosophy should 
ignore what people are willing to do,” she does relegate these considerations to having only 
derivative and instrumental importance.146 “It is one thing,” she says, “to lay out an objective 
required by justice, another to implement policies capable of achieving that objective.”147 In 
contrast, my argument shows that unjust dispositions and conduct are relevant to identifying our 
requirements of justice and not only the means by which to bring them about. 
Second, even if a specific agent’s wrongful motives and actions do not release them from 
their moral obligations, we still need to answer the question of what these agents, such as an 
individual citizen, a corporation, or the state, should do given (the likelihood) that some of their 
own dispositions or actions will be unjust. For example, perhaps it is the case that the state as a 
collective agent is obligated <to not commit or be disposed towards corruption, partiality, or 
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abusing state power and to not waste resources on preventing state corruption, partiality, or the 
abuse of power>.148 This duty seems reasonable because the state is able to fulfill the first conjunct 
of the obligation without undue costs and there would be no need to hinder its own corruption, 
partiality, and the abuse of power when the first conjunct is fulfilled. The state is not freed from 
this obligation because in reality it will or is likely to commit or to have inclinations towards 
corruption, partiality, or the abuse of power. So in a sense, there is nothing wrong with a theory of 
justice that does no more than establishes this duty as an imperative of justice for the state and 
defends it by saying that the state cannot be “let off the moral hook” because of its own moral 
failings. But that theory is also likely to strike us as practically useless in another sense because it 
does not tell us what the state should do in light of a realistic assessment of how the state will or 
will be disposed to act.149 Therefore, in both moral and political philosophy, agent’s own unjust 
motivations can be very significant for justifying the duties of justice we are interested in. 
Anderson does not deny this point, but it is worth stressing given its importance for constructing 
a nonideal theory that gives us the practical guidance that we need.  
2.4 Status Quo Bias, Downgraded Agency and Unjust Advantages 
I have argued that the center of Anderson’s pragmatist nonideal methodology are the views 
that our moral judgments and principles are better justified if we properly incorporate the empirical 
evidence provided by experiments in living, that such evidence is necessary for justification, and 
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that justification is possible with sufficient empirical evidence and apart from a priori reflection 
about the moral requirements that govern very different circumstances. I have also concurred that 
nonideal methodology must be empirically realistic and take into account the capacities of human 
beings, an empirical and causal investigation into existing injustices and what would remove them, 
and the burdens that proposed solutions entail. In addition, I have contended that unjust 
motivations and conduct are significant for identifying our duties of justice in nonideal theory in 
ways that Anderson does not appreciate. Using my reconstruction of pragmatist nonideal 
methodology, in this final section, I would like to consider Tommie Shelby’s trenchant criticisms 
of Anderson’s approach. Although I have disagreed with Anderson at some points, our differences 
will not affect the assessment of Shelby’s objections. 
Shelby argues that Anderson’s pragmatist approach is a version of what he calls “the 
medical model” that justifies ideals or policies by (1) describing a “social problem … ([e.g.] the 
prevalence of impoverished single-mother families and youth violence),” (2) identifying the causal 
“linchpin” that perpetuates those problems “(joblessness or segregation),” and (3) proposing “a 
cost-effective solution that would remove this linchpin (a jobs program or an integration initiative) 
with the expectation that [the problem] will, eventually, fade away as a result.”150 (4) “The primary 
aim of those working within this framework,” he says, “is to increase the material welfare of people 
… through narrowly targeted and empirically grounded interventions into their lives.”151 Shelby 
calls this approach the medical model because its proponents often say that “the persistent cries of 
injustice and other grievances … are conceived as symptoms (like headaches, fatigue, and 
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insomnia) to be treated by empirically grounded interventions, which are conceived as potential 
cures for social ills”.152 His primary worry is not about the use of “biological or medical 
metaphors” or “the medical model per se,” which “can be an appropriate way to think about and 
respond to a worrisome social problem when that problem is not a matter of basic justice.”153 
However, when “problems are a consequence of injustice,” he maintains that the medical 
framework has “serious limitations and pitfalls.”154 
First, Shelby says that the medical approach suffers from “the problem of status quo bias” 
because “[j]ust as physicians take basic human anatomy as given when treating patients, [those] 
working within the medical model treat the background structure of society as given and focus 
only on alleviating the burdens of the disadvantaged … In short, features of society that could and 
should be altered often get little scrutiny;” Second, there is “the problem of downgraded agency” 
in that “the technocratic reasoning of the medical model marginalizes the political agency of those 
it aims to help … regard[ing] [them] as passive victims in need of assistance rather than as potential 
allies in what should be a collective effort to secure justice for all.” The medical model is 
technocratic because only social scientific experts can design the policies needed to fix complex 
social problems and lead society to benefit the disadvantaged. Third, “the unjust-advantage blind 
spot problem” claims that since the medical framework “focus[es] on the problems of the 
disadvantaged[,] [it] can divert attention from or obscure the numerous ways in which the 
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advantaged unfairly benefit from an unjust social structure.”155 In order to avoid these difficulties, 
Shelby argues that we should adopt “a systemic-injustice framework,” in which “both the 
government and ordinary citizens are viewed as having a duty to ensure that the social system of 
cooperation we all participate in is just.”156 In this perspective, everyone’s agency is respected 
because they are seen as moral agents who have duties of justice and the injustice of social 
institutions and their distribution of benefits and burdens is always in view. 
The medical model is not an accurate representation of Anderson’s pragmatism, and 
consequently Shelby’s objections do not undermine it. Although (1) identifying social problems, 
(2) providing in-depth empirical analysis into their causes, and (3) ascertaining empirically 
supported solutions to these problems is part of her approach, it is not true that (4) increasing “the 
material welfare of people” is its “primary aim.” Rather, pragmatism as a nonideal methodology 
seeks to construct a “nonideal theory … [that] advance[s] principles and ideals … that we need to 
cope with the injustices in our current world, and to move us to something better.”157 The specific 
problems that it is concerned with are identifying and complying with requirements of justice and 
figuring out how we ought to respond to social injustices including unjust conduct by individual 
persons and social institutions as well as unjust distributions of social goods. Hence, the principles 
of social equality that Anderson justifies using a pragmatist moral epistemology govern the 
distribution of rights, opportunities and the powers and ends of political offices.158 These principles 
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can be used to identify the parts of a social system that are unjust and should be reformed as well 
as unjust advantages that should be redistributed. Therefore, the status-quo bias and the unjust-
advantage blind spot objections are mistaken. Pragmatist nonideal methodology does not “focus 
only on alleviating the burdens of the disadvantaged” and “treat the background structure of 
society as given” or ignore “the numerous ways in which the advantaged unfairly benefit from an 
unjust social structure.” On the contrary, it establishes principles of justice that reveal the features 
of social arrangements that caused or cause injustice, the unjust advantages generated by such a 
system, and unjust disadvantages that we may have duties of justice to remove.  
Anderson responds to the downgraded agency objection by saying that “it is odd that 
Shelby treats the new integrationists [including herself] as exemplars of the medical model … In 
the new integrationist vision, … all citizens [are] to exercise their agency to form a more perfect 
union.”159 Indeed, in the work that Shelby criticizes, she says that “all citizens have a duty to 
promote the justice of social arrangements, and … it is just to expect all citizens to bear their fair 
share of the costs of integration.”160 Furthermore, she holds that racial justice can be achieved only 
if both unjustly disadvantaged black citizens and unjustly advantaged white citizens fulfill their 
responsibilities: “black[] [Americans] need to change, white[] [Americans] need to change, and 
we need to change. These changes can happen only through racial integration.”161 In spite of these 
statements, Shelby may argue that there are certain features of her pragmatist methodology that do 
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not fully respect the moral and political agency of the unjustly disadvantaged and that conflict with 
her substantive views. Shelby seems to express a more complex assessment of this kind when he 
says that Anderson’s “medical model” has “top-down social-engineering” and “technocratic” as 
well as “bottom-up” “democratic pragmatist” and “populist moments” in which ordinary citizens’ 
moral agency is fully recognized.162 So let us consider whether pragmatist nonideal methodology 
is committed to minimizing the moral and political agency of the unjustly disadvantaged.  
In my view, none of the key features of pragmatism suggest that victims of injustice are 
not moral and political agents. Pragmatist nonideal methodology is defined by a certain 
experimental and empiricist way of justifying requirements of justice, but this does not suggest 
that the unjustly disadvantaged or oppressed are not moral agents who are responsible for doing 
their share to realize justice. They are moral agents just in case they have certain rational and moral 
capacities, which is a separate matter from pragmatism’s moral epistemology. What pragmatism 
adds is that the duties that the victims of injustice possess are better and necessarily justified using 
the evidence of experiments in living and can be justified without a priori reflection about very 
distant circumstances. In addition, it says that justification must be empirically realistic in the ways 
we have discussed in the previous section. But these points are entirely compatible with the agency 
of the unjustly disadvantaged and with their not being simply “passive victims” whose 
“motivational and cognitive tendencies are … viewed as levers that technocrats manipulate to 
direct us toward our common good.”163 
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However, Shelby has an additional worry that stems from his “Rawlsian … commitment 
to public justification.”164 “[O]n the Rawlsian model,” “basic ideals of justice” can be justified to 
all citizens “relatively independent of controversial social theory.”165 He accepts that in identifying 
the “means” that would “bring about social conditions that realize justice, sophisticated knowledge 
of empirical realities [which requires expertise not possessed by all] will of course be necessary 
… There is no assumption, however, that the [basic] principles of justice are themselves 
unknowable without a detailed empirical analysis of current social realities.”166 In contrast, “[a] 
technocratic vision of social justice would seem to marginalize the moral judgment and agency of 
the oppressed … as it would suggest that knowledge of what justice demands is largely out of their 
reach or beyond their understanding” because it depends on social scientific information that they 
do not comprehend.167 Based on these remarks, Shelby’s objection seems to be that because 
pragmatism claims that in-depth social scientific investigation is necessary to justify some 
fundamental requirements of justice, it disrespects the moral agency of ordinary citizens and the 
unjustly disadvantaged because it entails that “ordinary participants, including the oppressed, are 
[not] regarded as fully competent to judge what social justice demands,” where full competence 
means that one can know or understand the grounds of a principle of justice first-hand and without 
reliance of the testimony of experts.168 
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I cannot fully assess the Rawlsian position on which Shelby’s more specific downgraded 
agency objection is based here.169 It is a controversial stance that not even all theories that have 
some requirement of mutual justification share.170 Nevertheless, several critical remarks are in 
order. First, if it is true that the justification of certain requirements of justice involves social 
scientific facts or theories that not all ordinary citizens can understand, then holding this view does 
not disrespect these citizens’ epistemic or moral agency. In general, we should value and respect 
a person’s epistemological and moral agency in proportion to (what the available evidence 
indicates about) what their actual epistemological and moral powers are.171 For example, we do 
not fail to honor a person by believing that a social scientist or a climate scientist knows things 
about social policy or climate change that she does not, if that is true. It is unclear then why we 
should think that it downgrades or marginalizes a person to think that she may not fully understand 
the reasons for certain requirements of justice that involve complex social science. Furthermore, 
it is worth stressing that Anderson’s pragmatism does entail that the epistemic and moral capacities 
of ordinary citizens and the unjustly disadvantaged are very significant. This is because they are 
among the most affected by existing social institutions, laws, and policies and their experiences of 
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the actual consequences of current social arrangements and their moral intuitions are essential to 
moral justification. Hence, according to pragmatism, justification is importantly social because the 
required knowledge is dispersed among many different groups, including trained experts and 
everyday citizens, such that figuring out just requirements and social arrangements will have to 
involve each of them.172 
Second, it is implausible that all (relatively) basic principles of social justice can be 
justified without reference to sophisticated social science. Consider, for example, Rawls’s fair 
equal opportunity principle that states that people with the same abilities and motivation should 
have the same socio-economic opportunities no matter their starting position in society.173 This is 
a principle with extensive social and institutional consequences that would affect the lives of 
everyone in society if it were realized. Given its weighty consequences, it is not reasonable to think 
that we could be justified in believing this principle or thinking that we should apply it without 
careful consideration of its actual practical implications, which will require in-depth social 
scientific knowledge. For example, although the principle may seem very attractive in the abstract, 
reflection on its consequences reveals that it is “[n]otoriously … incompatible with anything 
resembling current family structures, and perhaps any feasible childrearing arrangements.”174 
Social scientific investigation may very well be necessary to find other consequences that we may 
want to avoid and be required to formulate a replacement principle that sufficiently respects all 
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our values. Nevertheless, as I have argued, acknowledging the importance of social science for 
moral justification does not disrespect ordinary citizens, even if it means they do not have 
knowledge of or understand the entire basis of a principle of justice. 
Third, even if we grant Shelby’s Rawlsian view, it does not seem to be at odds with 
Anderson’s pragmatism. For even though it is not part of what I have set forth as the core of 
Anderson’s pragmatism, it would be consistent for a pragmatist to adopt Shelby’s commitment to 
public justification. This would mean that justifying a requirement as a principle of justice must 
involve showing that ordinary citizens can fully understand the reasons for its validity. For this 
kind of pragmatist, if a principle cannot be known by ordinary citizens (without the testimony of 
experts) because of the social scientific premises needed to support it, then it is simply not a valid 
principle of justice. Hence, we can see that the status quo bias, the downgraded agency, and the 
unjust advantage blind spot objections are not genuine problems for pragmatist nonideal 














Chapter 3: Integration, Corrective Necessities and Unjust 
Constraints 
African Americans living in racially segregated neighborhoods are significantly 
disadvantaged in terms of income, wealth, educational achievement, employment, exposure to 
crime, and risk of incarceration in comparison to white Americans. Although overtly racist beliefs 
about black Americans having less innate ability have steadily declined among white Americans, 
there is much evidence that stereotypes about African Americans having less motivation, 
intelligence, being dependent on welfare or involved in drugs and gangs are widespread. These 
negative attitudes explain why there is little white support for public policies that would 
substantially alleviate black inequalities, the high rates of anti-black discrimination among real 
estate agents, homeowners, and landlords, and the unwillingness of many white Americans to live 
in integrated neighborhoods with more than a token number of black people.175 While many hold 
that segregated black Americans are no longer disadvantaged because of racial discrimination and 
that their persistent problems are their own responsibility, some forcefully make the case that 
existing racial inequalities are severe injustices that we have a duty to remedy. 
In The Imperative of Integration, Elizabeth Anderson argues that existing patterns of racial 
segregation in the United States and its disadvantages for African Americans were caused by and 
cause various forms of racial injustice.176 Her main claims are first, that racial integration is a 
necessary condition for correcting some of the unjust racial inequalities that are the effects of 
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segregation (given certain empirical and moral constraints), and second, that integration is an 
imperative of justice.177 The second claim is dependent on the first. It is because we have no way 
of correcting certain racial injustices other than integration that justice requires it. Similarly, even 
though Tommie Shelby criticizes Anderson’s case for integration as a corrective necessity and a 
requirement of justice, he maintains that everyone has a duty to do their part to achieve what is 
necessary for corrective justice.178 While the previous chapters have discussed many of their 
disagreements regarding moral justification in nonideal theory, both Anderson and Shelby concur 
that if a course of action, policy, or modification in how a social system distributes welfare, respect, 
or material goods is necessary to remove injustice or to achieve a just society, then everyone has 
a duty to do their part to bring those changes about. In other words, according to their views about 
nonideal methodology, you can derive requirements of justice from what is needed to correct 
injustice, and hence facts about which processes or social conditions are corrective necessities are 
especially important. This assumption is pivotal for Anderson and Shelby’s cases for and against 
an imperative of integration. 
In this chapter, I will criticize both Anderson and Shelby’s arguments and argue that we 
need significantly to modify how they try to ascertain our duties in relation to existing racial 
injustices and whether racial integration, benefiting segregated black neighborhoods, or some other 
course of action is requirement of justice. In section 1, I will examine Anderson’s relational theory 
of justice and social equality, how she derives the injustice of inequalities and states of affairs, and 
the practical implications of unjust disadvantages and conditions. Section 2 will summarize 
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Anderson’s case for the injustice of the disadvantages caused by segregation and for the necessity 
and duty of racial integration. I will argue that a simple version of Anderson’s argument is 
incomplete and that we need to consider more empirically informed and causally rigorous accounts 
of her reasoning. In section 3, I will reconstruct and defend Anderson’s social capital and anti-
stigmatization arguments, which represent her main support for the claim that integration is 
necessary to remedy certain racial injustices. Similarly, in section 4, I will examine how Anderson 
argues that integration is a requirement of justice and that it can be achieved through certain 
feasible, morally permissible and not unreasonably burdensome policies that involve black 
Americans, white Americans, and the state. However, I will contend that the fact that these policies 
could realize integration and correct racial injustice does not mean that any moral agent has a duty 
to support them. Furthermore, I will show that the corrective necessity of integration only means 
that we have defeasible reasons of justice to pursue it that we cannot satisfy otherwise, not that we 
have an all things considered duty of integration. Supporting integration is a duty for a particular 
agent, I will argue, just in case it is the morally permissible and feasible course of action with 
reasonable costs that has the best chance of advancing justice in her circumstances. Section 5 will 
contend that Shelby’s main criticisms of Anderson do not show that integration is not needed to 
correct some racial injustices or that integration is not a duty of justice. Moreover, I will argue that 
he is wrong to think that if integration is not necessary for corrective justice, then it is not an 
imperative of justice. Lastly, in section 6, I will consider Anderson and Shelby’s objections to my 
view that unjust motivations and actions (such as wrongful recalcitrance to integration or to 
reviving black neighborhoods) are significant facts for justifying duties of justice. Although I will 
not be able to establish the duties of certain agents regarding racial injustice or whether integration 




showing how we should justify those duties and how Anderson and Shelby’s influential positions 
are mistaken. 
3.1 Justice and Relational and Distributive Equality 
For Anderson, “justice [is fundamentally] a virtue of agents (including institutions)” and 
“principles [of justice]” inherently “regulate their conduct.”179 More specifically, “[j]ustice 
comprises that subset of the moral right tied to individual claim rights, which ground [conclusive 
or all things considered] duties of others to pay due regard to individuals’ interests.”180 It follows 
that “there can be no injustice without an agent who is (or was) substantively responsible for it – 
someone obligated to avoid, correct, or bear the costs of the injustice or of its correction or 
amelioration.”181 Duties and principles of justice are also subject to the “maxim that ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’: principles of justice must be feasible such that agents are able to follow them.”182 
“Valid claims of justice,” then, “must be addressed to agents who are in a position to make things 
right—or at least better. If what is demanded of them is impossible, then the claim is invalid.”183 
Importantly, according to this perspective, “justice as an evaluation applied to states of 
affairs is entirely derivative of justice as an appraisal of the conduct of agents. Where all agents 
conduct themselves justly – where they successfully comply with all reasonable demands – the 
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state of affairs resulting from their conduct is just.”184 This includes the distribution of social goods 
and welfare. There is no way to discern whether a highly unequal distribution of wealth, 
opportunities, respect, or well-being is unjust by looking at that distribution itself. It is unjust if 
and only if some agent had or has a duty of justice to bring about a different distribution or that 
distribution causes unjust actions. Anderson’s conception of justice (and equality) is “relational” 
because it holds that the “relation[s],” or “mode[s] of conduct” by which “one [moral agent] 
interacts with (or avoids) [an]other [agent], or acts in ways that affect the other [agent’s] interests 
or autonomy,” are “proper objects of direct normative assessment in a theory of justice,” whereas 
some contrasting views take “de facto inequalities in goods as objects of direct normative 
assessment independent of the relations through which they are produced or their effects on social 
relations.”185 The relations of moral agents are the basic objects of normative assessment because 
justice is fundamentally about whether they respect the claim rights of others and comply with the 
corresponding duties in their actions. 
Shelby appears to share a similar view of justice. “The very idea of social justice,” he says, 
“presupposes the duty of justice: no one can resent being treated unjustly by the basic structure of 
society yet consistently reject the duty of justice.”186 The idea seems to be that the injustice of a 
social structure is essentially something that can be resented or complained about and that this 
implies the existence of an all things considered duty of justice that is binding on some moral agent 
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and that has been violated.187 This means that distributional inequalities and disadvantages are 
unjust only if there is some agent who had or has a duty to avoid or remove them. In any case, 
Shelby’s criticisms of Anderson will clearly presuppose that an imperative of justice means that 
some agent is required to act as the duty directs. While for Anderson duties of justice may be 
essentially linked to claim rights and for Shelby justice may be especially about duties related to 
the basic institutions of society, these aspects of their views are not central to their disagreement 
about integration. What matters is that for both of them, a requirement or imperative of justice is 
a duty that some agent has conclusive reasons to fulfill. 
Anderson’s theory of relational and social equality falls within her more general framework 
of justice, but its requirements apply more specifically to the citizens of modern democracies: “All 
of the members of a democratic society have a just claim to stand in relations of equality with their 
fellow citizens.”188 She then derives a standard for the justice of distributive outcomes in a 
democratic society as follows: “an inequality in the distribution of some good is unjust if it … is 
caused by unjust [or unequal] relations … among people … or causes such unjust [or unequal] 
relations.”189 Similarly, states of affairs, which are not distributive inequalities, may be unjust even 
if they are not disadvantageous in themselves, if they cause unjust conduct.190 A disadvantage is 
caused by unjust relations when it is the result of a violation of a duty of justice, and a state of 
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affairs causes unjust relations when it tends to make it the case or to make it more likely that these 
duties will be infringed.191 The fact that a distributive inequality or state of affairs is unjust means 
that we have a prima facie duty or defeasible reasons of justice to change them in order to mitigate 
the disadvantages or wrongs they constitute or cause. (I will explain why unjust states of affairs 
only imply defeasible reasons instead of a conclusive duty to rectify them shortly.) 
Judging the injustice of a distributional inequality or state of affairs, then, requires knowing 
the principles or reasons of justice that apply to moral agents. Anderson argues that racial 
segregation in the United States violated several requirements of justice including those protecting 
the rights of African Americans against various forms of “[o]ppression” or “social inequalities that 
impose severe disadvantages on its victims.”192 However, we will only need to focus on two 
principles that are especially important for her case that integration is a corrective necessity and a 
duty of justice.193 The first we may call 
 
The Anti-Stigmatization Principle: “Conduct grounded in group prejudice or stigma toward 
racial, gender, ethnic, and similar groups [should be avoided or stopped] because it assaults 
the dignity of groups that do not deserve to be demeaned.”194 
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Racial prejudice is “out-group antipathy” towards another racial group.195 Racial 
stigmatization consists in representations of a racial group whose contents involve “(1) racial 
stereotypes [or generalizations], (2) racial attributions, or explanations of why members of the 
racial group tend to fit their stereotypes, that rationalize and motivate (3) derogatory evaluations 
of and (4) demeaning or antipathetic attitudes (such as hatred, contempt, pity, condescension, 
disgust, aversion, envy, distrust, and willful indifference) toward the target group and its 
members,” which are (5) “practically engaged” or “cause[] one to act in ways that disadvantage or 
insult [its] objects.”196 This broad category includes “racist” representations that are consciously 
endorsed and those that are “unconscious” and not endorsed, as is typical of cognitive biases.197 
The second requirement is: 
 
The Narrow Principle of Fair Opportunity: “[A]n individual’s access to opportunities 
should not be undermined by (1) racial prejudice, (2) racial stigmatization, (3) ethnocentric 
conduct facilitated by the state, or (4) ethnocentric conduct contrary to antidiscrimination 
principles that govern regulable institutions of civil society.”198 
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Ethnocentric conduct by state officials is unjust because they have “a public duty to serve all 
citizens impartially,” and similarly, in civil society, “operators of public accommodations, 
including private commercial establishments,” have “a duty to serve all members of the public 
impartially” and “employers and those selling real estate … are obligated to do their part to ensure 
fair economic opportunities to all.”199 
In my view, we should understand these principles to represent prima facie duties or 
defeasible reasons of justice. This is because they may conflict with others that we have more 
reason to satisfy and therefore cannot be taken as all things considered duties, at least without 
further justification. For example, we may have the resources to realize a principle against racial 
stigmatization in employment or another against lethal police violence but not both, and justice 
may require that we take the latter option due to its comparative urgency. We can accept both as 
genuine principles of justice but only if they are understood as pro tanto reasons of justice. 
Recognizing that principles of justice can represent defeasible reasons also allows us to 
extend Anderson’s account of our reasons to change distributional outcomes and states of affairs. 
So far we have seen that that a state of affairs is unjust if it is caused by or causes unjust actions, 
that is, a violation of someone’s claim right or an all things considered duty of justice. We have 
reasons to remedy the disadvantages caused by injustice and to modify social arrangements if that 
would prevent unjust conduct. However, in addition, we can have reasons to alter a state of affairs 
if it means more principles of justice will be satisfied or fulfilled to a greater degree, even if current 
conditions are not the effect of injustice and do not cause agents to act unjustly. For our purposes, 
the most important case involves unconscious racial stigmatization and the disadvantages it 
 




produces. As we shall see, Anderson holds that agents cannot eliminate some of the unconscious 
roots of racial stigmatization apart from racial integration.200 But this produces complications for 
her theory of justice. Insofar as it is infeasible for agents under segregation to prevent these 
unconscious biases and their effects, conduct grounded in unconscious stigmatization does not 
violate a duty of justice. Likewise, we do not have reasons to change things to stop these agents 
from not respecting a duty against unconscious racial discrimination because, under segregation, 
no such requirement exists for them. Nevertheless, Anderson presupposes that we do have reasons 
of justice to intervene in social conditions in order to reduce unconscious racial stigmatization and 
how it undermines African Americans’ opportunities. The anti-stigmatization and fair opportunity 
principles, I propose, are among these defeasible reasons and so understood, they fill a gap in 
Anderson’s theory and argument, which focuses on the causal connections between states of affairs 
and conclusive duties of justice. 
We may then have defeasible reasons of justice to change distributive outcomes and social 
arrangements if they cause or are caused by unjust conduct or if it would better realize principles 
of justice. However, neither the injustice of states of affairs nor defeasible principles imply that 
any moral agent has or will have an (all things considered) requirement of justice to change current 
social conditions. As we’ve seen in previous chapters, duties of justice depend on several factors 
including (a) the extent of the relevant moral agent’s abilities in the circumstances, (b) the 
availability of morally permissible actions, (c) the costs involved in following various courses of 
action and whether they are reasonable, (d) the probabilities that the agent will succeed in realizing 
greater justice and (e) the risks that injustice will be exacerbated conditional on various actions. 
 




That a distribution is unjust or that we have pro tanto reasons to rectify it does not supply us with 
any information about these factors that is necessary to justify an imperative of justice. Conversely, 
the fact that no one has a duty to correct an unjust distribution does not imply that the state of 
affairs is not unjust. Moral agents may not have the capacity to remedy certain unjust inequalities, 
but that would not alter the fact that the disadvantages are unjust if they were caused by past racial 
prejudice. 
The way that Anderson and Shelby connect unjust states of affairs to the duties of specific 
moral agents is through a general duty of justice. “[A]ll citizens,” Anderson says, “have a duty to 
promote the justice of social arrangements … [and] it is just to expect all citizens to bear their fair 
share of the costs” of realizing what is necessary or “instrumental to justice.”201 Likewise, for 
Shelby, “[t]he duty of justice is a moral requirement all are bound by … When an institutional 
arrangement is seriously unjust, the duty of justice … demand[s] … that we help to establish a just 
social order and to reform unjust institutions.”202 Shelby and Anderson concur that “[t]he duty to 
correct injustices falls to us all, the disadvantaged and the privileged, so it is reasonable to expect 
the oppressed to pay some of the costs of social reform.”203 Shelby adds that we should avoid 
increasing the burdens of the oppressed if “the goals of corrective justice can be achieved without 
them.”204 However, if certain reforms (such as racial integration) that imply costs for the oppressed 
are necessary to correct injustice, then they do have a duty to take on these “necessary burdens,” 
 
201 Anderson, 148–49. 
202 Shelby, Dark Ghettos, 57. 
203 Cf. Anderson: “black[] [Americans] need to change, white[] [Americans] need to change, and we need to change. 
These changes can happen only through racial integration.” Shelby, 76; Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 186. 




given that they are “share[d] … equitably” and not unreasonable.205 When Anderson and Shelby 
say that something is necessary to correct injustice, they mean that it is required given certain non-
normative or descriptive and moral constraints, including physical laws, the current state of the 
world, the capabilities of human beings, specific causal relations disclosed by social science, and 
the right of freedom of association.206 However, as we will see, within these constraints, their aim 
is to identify what is necessary and possible for specific sets of distinct agents to do in order to 
remove certain racial injustices.207 In particular, the courses of action, policies, and principles they 
set forth are supposed to be possible and necessary for certain black Americans, white Americans, 
and the state if they work together to rectify unjust disadvantages. 
I will examine the parts of Anderson and Shelby’s views in the last paragraph in detail. 
However, for the most part, I will not challenge their theories of justice. Rather I will disagree with 
some of the conclusions they attempt to draw when they apply their theories to facts about the 
history and effects of racial segregation and the benefits of integration. 
3.2 Segregation, Inequality and Integration 
Anderson maintains that racial segregation in the United States and its detrimental effects 
are unjust because they are caused by and cause unjust relations.208 I will focus on her treatment 
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of spatial segregation or the condition in which different identity groups occupy separate “social 
spaces and institutions,” especially residential neighborhoods.209 The residential segregation of 
black Americans in relation to white Americans is high with most African Americans living in 
majority-black neighborhoods and with half living in “hypersegregated” areas.210 Subsequently, 
public K-12 schools are highly segregated too since their populations reflect that of segregated 
neighborhoods.211 This state of affairs is “the legacy of state-sponsored antiblack racial 
discrimination” in the forms of private housing discrimination, the state’s promotion of racial 
redlining and financing of white flight from black and integrated neighborhoods, the creation of 
new city borders, local governments and zoning regulations to exclude African Americans from 
white neighborhoods and their tax revenues and public services, and the placement of public 
schools in racially segregated neighborhoods.212 As a result, segregated black Americans have 
much lower access to employment opportunities, retail, commercial and healthcare services, which 
are mostly located in distant white neighborhoods, and they suffer from higher levels of poverty, 
crime, blight, and tax burdens and from lower quality public goods such “police protection, public 
order, fire protection, trash removal, streets, parks, public recreational facilities and schools.”213 
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Especially significant to Anderson’s argument is how segregation affects social capital or 
“networks of people in social relationships that serve as resources” for socioeconomic 
advancement, for example, “by providing information channels, supporting cooperation and 
reciprocity … and sustaining other social norms that coordinate people’s behavior” (cultural 
capital), and transferring “marketable skills” (human capital).214 Segregation deprives black 
Americans of social, cultural, and human capital because it closes them off from white Americans’ 
social networks, which are crucial sources of information about opportunities, job referrals, 
cultural norms of cooperation, and marketable skills. To the significant extent that segregation and 
its inequalities were caused by racial prejudice and stigmatization and illegitimate ethnocentrism 
(in violation of duties to satisfy the anti-stigmatization and fair opportunity principles), its 
disadvantages for African Americans are unjust. 
Furthermore, Anderson argues that “even if current patterns of racial segregation and 
resulting race-based disadvantage had been produced through innocent processes, they would still 
be unjust … [because] they cause … unjust group relations.”215 In particular, segregation leads to 
racial stigmatization through the operation of several cognitive biases. For example, we have 
biases (1) “to attribute positive behaviors of in-group members [to their internal] disposition[s], 
and negative behaviors [to their external] situations, while reversing these attributions for out-
group members” (ethnocentrism or in-group favoritism), (2) “to align [our] perceptions and 
judgments with those of in-group members” (the shared reality bias), and (3) “to form stereotypes 
about a group with which they have little contact on the basis of unusual events, such as sensational 
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crimes, connected to that group” (the illusory correlation bias).216 Since under segregation white 
Americans will have few, if any, black Americans in their groups, in-group favoritism and the 
shared reality bias mean that they will tend to develop stigmatizing representations of African 
Americans that explain the negative stereotypes about them in terms of that insult their character, 
culture, or choices and that these ideas will not be challenged by black American experiences. 
Moreover, the illusory correlation bias means that segregated white Americans will also tend to 
possess stigmatizing stereotypes about African Americans based on encounters with or depictions 
of deviant black people in the media.217 These unconscious biases and stigmatizing representations 
lead to conduct which insult and disadvantage black Americans. Hence, segregation causes white 
Americans to violate their duties to reject racial stigmatization and hence, to unjustly undermine 
African Americans’ opportunities. That is, insofar as white Americans are unable to avoid 
stigmatizing conduct, segregation causes violations of the anti-stigmatization and fair opportunity 
principles, which we have reasons to prevent. 
In the chapter “The Imperative of Integration,” Anderson puts her basic case as follows: 
“If racial segregation is the problem, it stands to reason that racial integration is [a necessary part 
of] the remedy. Since the problem is an injustice, the remedy is an imperative of justice.”218 I take 
these statements to support Anderson’s main claims that (1) “racial integration is … necessary … 
to overcome unjust racial inequality in opportunities [and] undo racial stigmatization” and that (2) 
integration is a requirement of justice. Integration is an indispensable part of the solution because 
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it is “the negation of segregation” and undoes the causal mechanisms that led to and perpetuate 
black disadvantage.219 Integration can be divided into four dimensions: (1) Formal desegregation 
consists in “the abolition of laws and policies enforcing racial separation;” (2) Spatial integration 
consists in the common occupancy and  “use … of facilities and public spaces by substantial 
numbers of all races;” (3) Formal social integration “occurs when members of different races 
cooperate in accordance with institutionally defined social roles, and all races occupy all roles in 
enough numbers that roles are not racially identified;” (4) Informal social integration involves 
“cooperation, ease, welcome, trust, affiliation and intimacy that go beyond the requirements of 
organizational defined roles.”220 Spatial integration, such as residential integration, improves “the 
socioeconomic and physical well-being of groups [unjustly] disadvantaged by segregation by 
enhancing their access to public and social goods” of white spaces, while social integration with, 
for example, neighbors, colleagues, schoolmates, and friends advances “opportunities by opening 
up social networks of information and referral to [unjustly] disadvantaged groups, and by enabling 
them to acquire the cultural [and human] capital needed to advance in mainstream institutions.”221 
In these ways, spatial and social integration would alleviate African Americans’ unjust 
disadvantages that were caused by racial segregation. Anderson uses several social scientific 
studies, including those about the Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity housing integration 
programs and school integration projects, to support these claims. 
 
219 Anderson, 112. 
220 Anderson, 116. 




In addition, Anderson contends that social integration “reduce[s] antiblack prejudice, 
stigmatization, discrimination, and anxiety.”222 One of the reasons is that “[s]everal cognitive 
biases that lead to stigmatization under segregation lead to destigmatization under integration.”223 
For example, frequent cooperation among racial groups creates a new integrated in-group whose 
members become targets of ethnocentrism or in-group favoritism, which means that black 
Americans will be less subject to stigmatizing attribution biases. Likewise, in integrated groups, 
the shared reality bias will mean that African Americans’ experiences will influence white 
Americans’ perceptions and beliefs, making them less reliant on stigmatizing ideas. Furthermore, 
repeated interactions with African Americans means that the illusory correlation bias will not 
induce white Americans to form stereotypes of black people based on sensational and deviant 
events, such as murders.224 By reducing racial stigmatization, social integration prevents violations 
of the anti-stigmatization and fair opportunity principles, which are effects of segregated 
conditions. 
When making her primary case for the imperative of integration, Anderson spends most of 
her time showing how social scientific evidence consistently confirms the hypothesis that 
integration mitigates the unjust consequences of segregation.225 However, in my view, this does 
not demonstrate that integration is a corrective necessity. The success of integration does not imply 
that there are no other ways of removing the unjust disadvantages of segregation. In fact, Anderson 
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accepts that some of the unjust inequalities brought about by segregation might be rectified without 
integration. For “material resources,” she says that we could be able to eliminate unjust 
disadvantages by “moving resources to people, rather than moving people to resources.”226 
Similarly, it seems that the social and public goods of segregated black neighborhoods could be 
improved at least to some extent by resource distribution as well. Hence, the first part of 
Anderson’s basic presentation of her argument is wrong or incomplete. Just because racial 
segregation was the cause of black Americans’ unjust disadvantages doesn’t mean that we need to 
undo segregation through integration to remove those injustices. Perhaps, segregation could only 
cause these injustices because other causal processes, which fall short of integration, were not in 
place, such as fair resource distribution. Therefore, in order to establish the corrective necessity of 
integration, Anderson needs to show that certain unjust disadvantages can only be removed by 
racial integration. 
3.3 The Social Capital and the Anti-Stigmatization Arguments 
Fortunately, Anderson provides two arguments that attempt to meet this demand. The first 
is the social capital argument that “black disadvantage is caused not simply by lack of material 
resources but by lack of social and cultural capital, which can be acquired only through interracial 
interaction [and integration].”227 It is worth carefully reconstructing Anderson’s reasoning here. 
Since the state, local governments, real estate agents, and individual citizens unjustly excluded 
African Americans from white neighborhoods and their superior schools, jobs, and public services, 
segregated black Americans were prevented from forming social relationships with advantaged 
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white Americans in their residential communities, educational institutions and places of 
employment. Hence, segregation unjustly disadvantaged African Americans’ access to social 
capital by undermining their opportunities to join white Americans’ social networks, which are 
resources for gaining (a) information about employment opportunities and (b) referrals for jobs 
and promotion. In addition, the separation of black and white communities has meant that 
segregated African Americans have developed cultural differences in linguistic “dialect,” “body 
language, habits of emotional expression and management, styles of personal appearance, … 
interaction rituals,” “leisure activities … [and] cultural reference points that are the basis for small 
talk with coworkers” than those prevalent in the classroom and in majority-white and integrated 
institutions and companies.228 For example, African Americans may not know “what topics of 
conversation to avoid in white social circles, what clothes to wear to put white[] [Americans] at 
ease, how ‘black’ hairstyles can get one in trouble at work, and how to decode indirect styles of 
speech that appear more prevalent among white[] [Americans].”229 Their unfamiliarity with white 
cultural norms impedes segregated African Americans’ opportunities because it hinders their 
education and their ability to compete for jobs and to succeed at work because of increased conflict, 
miscommunication, and lack of cooperation. What appears as “ordinary frankness” to some black 
Americans may be perceived as “confrontational” by white Americans, and “the straight-talking 
black worker in the white-dominated environment will be labeled as having an ‘attitude,’ and her 
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career will suffer accordingly.”230 Segregation, therefore, unjustly deprives African Americans’ 
access to (c) cultural capital or cultural habits, norms, and skills that facilitate socioeconomic 
advancement. Furthermore, the pool of (d) human capital or marketable skills in black 
neighborhoods is unjustly much lower than in white communities because segregation enabled 
white Americans to hoard job opportunities, wealth, and high quality schools. Since “[c]hildren 
acquire marketable skills from the social contacts in their community—parents, other relatives, 
neighbors, and peers, … segregation ties children to a disadvantaged structure of social capital, 
thereby perpetuating the effects of historic discrimination in human capital development.”231 
Against this background, the central question of the social capital argument is whether 
residential and social integration is necessary to remove the unjust disadvantages that existing 
African Americans (or those soon to exist) have in terms of accessing social capital for gaining (a) 
information about job opportunities, (b) recommendations for jobs and promotion, (c) cultural 
capital, and (d) human capital. Even if there are other ways to mitigate these disadvantages that 
would take several decades, Anderson assumes that existing segregated black Americans should 
not have to wait that long to obtain redress.232 In addition, the social capital argument is about what 
is necessary to eliminate all the unjust inequalities in these areas to the extent that it is possible. 
Any effort to challenge Anderson’s argument must show that all the relevant unjust inequalities 
could be removed without integration. 
 
230 Anderson, 37. 
231 Anderson, 35. 




The first part of the social capital argument is that both residential and social integration 
are necessary to adequately mitigate black Americans’ unjust disadvantages in (c) cultural and (d) 
human capital. Shelby objects that the cultural habits of majority-white neighborhoods and 
institutions can be learned and maintained in formal educational contexts and in segregated black 
neighborhoods and that this means that residential integration is not necessary.233 However, even 
if we grant that these cultural habits can be formally taught, black Americans’ access to prevailing 
educational and corporate habits and norms would still be better and their unjust inequalities of 
cultural capital lower if they resided in integrated neighborhoods and acquired these cultural skills 
through their everyday relationships and in school and work, instead of having to attend extra 
classes.234 Likewise, although marketable skills can be taught in formal educational and business 
settings, part of African Americans’ unjust disadvantages is that their residential communities have 
a much smaller pool of informal sources of human capital than white or integrated neighborhoods. 
Similarly, some African Americans living in segregated neighborhoods may be able to obtain the 
relevant cultural habits and marketable skills by traveling to distant integrated workplaces or 
schools, but cultural and human capital would still be more widely accessible to black Americans 
if they lived in integrated neighborhoods and nearer to integrated educational and business settings. 
Furthermore, we cannot eliminate African Americans’ unjust inequalities by reproducing the 
cultural and human capital advantages of privileged white communities in black neighborhoods 
any time soon. For it is impossible to intentionally and to rapidly alter the culture habits of entire 
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communities or to transfer many kinds of marketable skills to numerous people without extensive 
training and time. In addition, even though companies and professionals (and residents) have a 
responsibility to construct cultural norms that meet minority groups part way, “considerations of 
inertia or cost call for more change on the part of [segregated African Americans] in the direction 
of assimilation [to prevailing norms]” in order for them to undo substantial inequalities in cultural 
capital.235 Moreover, “it is impossible and undesirable to abolish informal routes to human[,] 
[cultural] and social capital development” or the ways that relationships with parents, relatives, 
neighbors, friends, and colleagues pass on marketable skills, cultural norms, and otherwise 
promote a person’s socioeconomic prospects outside of formal educational and business 
contexts.236 The above options seem to be the only ways of alleviating black Americans’ deficits 
in cultural and human capital other than integration. Since these alternatives are inadequate or 
impermissible and residential and social integration would remove more of black Americans’ 
unjust disadvantages in cultural and human capital, residential and social integration are necessary 
to correct these racial injustices. 
The second part of the social capital argument maintains that social and residential 
integration is necessary to adequately remedy African Americans’ access to (a) information about 
employment opportunities and (b) referrals for jobs and promotions given justifiable practices of 
meritocratic selection. While it may be possible for institutions to not use knowledge of individuals 
gained by social relationships in granting opportunities, Anderson argues that “businesses cannot 
afford to [and are permitted to not] completely cast aside personal knowledge of individuals and 
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relations of trust built from face-to-face relationships when it comes to filling more advanced 
positions. Not all information genuinely relevant to merit-based selection can be encapsulated in 
a resume.”237 Since relationships with white Americans are needed for black Americans to acquire 
the chance to attain these recommendations, correcting African Americans’ unjust disadvantages 
on this front requires social integration. In addition, residential integration is also necessary 
because it would increase black-white social interaction and more effectively correct the 
opportunities black Americans would have to form relationships that would lead to these referrals 
than integration in the workplace and schools would alone. It is more likely that information about 
job opportunities might be circulated in publicly accessible venues apart from social relationships. 
Yet, even here, it seems that African Americans would have a better chance of learning about 
desirable employment prospects if they were in more relationships with advantaged white 
Americans who could inform them about suitable openings that they might not have noticed. 
Hence, social and residential integration is required to sufficiently correct black Americans’ unjust 
inequalities in obtaining information about job opportunities as well. For the most part, I find 
Anderson’s social capital argument as reconstructed convincing, but we still need to consider 
Shelby’s primary critique of it in a later section. 
The second argument that Anderson supplies is the anti-stigmatization argument that the 
reduction of “stigmatizing ideas [that] operate unconsciously even among those who do not 
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endorse them,” which unjustly insult African Americans and harm their opportunities, “can take 
place only in [socially] integrated settings.”238 For the sake of argument, I will grant Anderson’s 
psychological claim that social integration is necessary to counteract unconscious racial 
stigmatization and the corresponding violations of the anti-stigmatization and fair opportunity 
principles. The problem for which the anti-stigmatization argument says integration is the solution 
is very widespread because it encompasses all the unconscious anti-black stigmatizing ideas that 
reside in white Americans (and other racial groups). In order to mitigate such unconscious 
representations, every or most white Americans would have to belong to an in-group with African 
Americans and to have frequent and positive interactions with them. While more integrated 
schools and workplaces in which white and black Americans form in-groups would mitigate 
unconscious stigmatization to a degree, the opportunities for and likelihood of the formation of 
these groups and of deeper relationships such as friendship would be much greater if residential 
neighborhoods were also integrated. Therefore, the anti-stigmatization argument can be extended 
to not only require social integration in educational and employment contexts but residential 
integration as well. If we grant Anderson’s psychological views, this argument also seems correct 
to me. 
3.4 Integration, Public Policy and Requirements of Justice 
The social capital and anti-stigmatization arguments show that spatial and social 
integration in residential neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces, etc. is necessary to sufficiently 
mitigate some of the unjust disadvantages that segregation has caused and causes. What does this 
imply about integration as a requirement of justice? The simple version of Anderson’s argument 
 




seems to suggest that once we know that “the problem [of racial segregation] is an injustice” and 
“racial integration is [a necessary part of] the remedy,” then we can conclude that “the remedy 
[and racial integration] is an imperative of justice.”239 Yet, Anderson recognizes that this argument 
is incomplete and that “we still need a fuller account of … the policies that could realize 
[integration].”240 In addition, Anderson argues that these policies must be morally permissible and 
respect everyone’s right to “freedom of … association” and that they must not involve costs for 
individuals that are “unreasonable.”241 If there are no morally permissible courses of action or 
policies with reasonable burdens that existing agents can implement and that can bring about 
residential and social integration, then integration cannot be a requirement of justice. The fact that 
integration is required for corrective justice does not mean that any of these necessary conditions 
for an imperative of integration are satisfied.  
For this reason, Anderson discusses social scientific studies of various public policies that 
promote integration. For each of these policies, a substantial number of (a) African Americans and 
(b) white Americans and (c) the state must perform their separate actions that are jointly necessary 
and sufficient for spatial and social integration to occur and to mitigate certain racial injustices.242 
For example, in the Gautreaux program (c) the state gave “7,100 poor black families … housing 
vouchers to move to racially integrated neighborhoods in Chicago and its suburbs.”243 According 
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to Anderson, studies show that the program was successful because (a) African Americans were 
motivated to take advantage of the opportunities in their new neighborhoods and over time (b) 
white Americans did not deny black Americans’ socioeconomic advancement out of 
discrimination or close their social networks to them. As a result, these integrated African 
Americans significantly gained in social, cultural, and human capital.244 
In addition, Anderson concedes that integration involves burdens for black Americans 
including “experiences of increased racial conflict, discrimination, and alienation.”245 She also 
agrees with Shelby that African Americans can have “morally acceptable reasons … to prefer a 
neighborhood in which their racial group predominates” such as “attenuation of social connections 
with friends and family still residing in the ghetto, lower access to businesses that cater to black 
tastes, … discomfort from living in a neighborhood dominated by alien cultural norms and political 
preferences[,] … prefer[ing] to resist injustice by building racial solidarity in black neighborhoods 
… [and] the benefits of [integration] [being] uncertain.”246 In order for the “psychic costs [of 
integration], especially for the stigmatized,” to be reasonable, “integrationist ideals and policies” 
must include “places of refuge, social settings in which [stigmatized groups] can count on 
unquestioned acceptance and affirmation, share their experiences with integration among 
themselves, and generate strategies for coping with the stresses of integration.”247 For the above 
reasons, Anderson says that “my integrationist theory … does not prescribe normative standards 
 
244 Anderson, 118. 
245 Anderson, 181. 
246 Anderson, “Dark Ghettos,” 281–82; Shelby, Dark Ghettos, chap. 2. 




that are impossible or unreasonably difficult for people to meet, nor standards that fail to serve 
their objectives.”248 
For the sake of argument, let us accept that integration is required to remedy some racial 
injustices and that the public policies for realizing integration that Anderson identifies are possible, 
effective, morally permissible and not too costly if certain African Americans, white Americans, 
and the state act in particular ways. Would Anderson then be able to defend the conclusion that 
any of these agents are subject to an imperative of integration? To answer this question, we need 
to distinguish several ways in which Anderson might hold that these agents are under a duty to 
support integration. (1) Anderson’s claim might be that these agents have a duty to act as they 
would in a successful scenario in which a sufficient number of them are doing their part in the 
integrative program such that substantial residential and social integration occurs. For example, 
(a) black Americans should use housing vouchers to move to integrated neighborhoods, (b) white 
Americans should form relationships with black Americans who join their neighborhood using 
those vouchers, and (c) the state should provide these housing vouchers to segregated African 
Americans. (2) Her view may be that some of these agents have a duty to promote integration 
(through her policies) and to not act in ways that would conflict with or hinder integration. (3) She 
may mean that some of these agents have a duty to promote integration (through her policies) in 
some of their actions, which is compatible with impeding integration in other ways. 
To simply matters, I will only consider the duties these agents have in relation to mitigating 
the unjust disadvantages of segregated African Americans. Hence, I will not address, for example, 
possible conflicts between promoting racial integration and ameliorating global poverty or climate 
 




change. Furthermore, I will assume that the duty that Anderson has in mind is more substantial 
than increasing the likelihood of integration by not being racially prejudiced or stigmatizing 
because this is an obvious way in which everyone can foster integration. 
The most fundamental difficulty with (1) the first view of a duty to support integration has 
to do with the fact that in order for residential and social integration to occur and to remedy unjust 
racial disadvantages multiple agents have to do their part.249 There is no single agent that is able 
to do what African Americans, white Americans, and the state must in order for integration to 
work, and so there is no requirement of justice applying to any agent to realize residential and 
social integration by itself. At the most, there are separate obligations that belong to the distinct 
participants in a plan to bring about integration. However, the existence of these duties for some 
agents is dependent on the actions of others. For example, if either (a) black Americans will not 
use state-provided housing vouchers to move to white neighborhoods, (b) white Americans will 
not accept African Americans that use those vouchers into their social networks, or (c) the state 
will not supply such housing vouchers, then participating in such a program will become infeasible 
or ineffective as a means of reducing black disadvantage for the other agents. Similarly, if the state 
does not provide funding for integration or the residents of certain white neighborhoods are 
expected to be intensely hostile or violent, then integration may prove unreasonably burdensome 
(according to Anderson and Shelby’s standards of reasonableness) for some black Americans.250 
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If supporting integration is infeasible, ineffective, too costly, or impermissible for any of these 
agents, then it is not a duty of justice for them. Therefore, the fact that there are certain policies for 
bringing about residential and social integration that would be effective, feasible, permissible, and 
not too burdensome if and only if multiple agents each do their separate parts does not imply that 
any specific agent has a duty of justice to support integration in current circumstances.  In order 
to justify an imperative to promote integration for any specific agent, we need to take into account 
how other agents will or are likely to act in the present and foreseeable circumstances. It is not 
possible directly to establish integration as a requirement of justice from identifying certain 
permissible and not too costly multi-agent programs that are able to realize integration and correct 
racial injustice. 
These points are significant because many white Americans are not willing to do their part 
in integration promoting programs and actively oppose their implementation by the state. As 
Anderson says,  
 
Truly large-scale state-centered attempts to racially integrate K-12 schools, as took place 
in the busing era, consistently encounter massive white resistance and are not politically 
feasible … [T]he overall picture is gloomy. Spontaneous residential racial integration of 
black[] [Americans] proceeds at a glacial pace. Voter initiatives and state legislatures are 
rolling back affirmative action by public universities, while the Supreme Court is 
restricting voluntary integration by K-12 schools. Federal enforcement of key civil rights 
initiatives—Brown v. Board of Education and its successor cases, the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, and the Fair Housing Act—is little more than perfunctory. Opinion research suggests 
that this state of affairs is just how white[] [Americans] want it—except they think they are 
not getting it since they believe government is doing too much to help black[] 
[Americans].251 
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Thus, insofar as the success or implementation of integration promoting policies depends on 
recalcitrant white Americans, black Americans will not have a duty to do their part (e.g. by using 
housing vouchers to integrate into majority-white neighborhoods) because they cannot or doing so 
will not (or is too unlikely) to alleviate racial injustice. Moreover, individual residents of 
segregated white neighborhoods may also not have a duty to create relationships with (many of) 
these African Americans because the state-sponsored program that would bring the latter into their 
neighborhood will not exist. Even if a white resident wanted the program to be realized, she may 
not have a duty to bring it about because it may be beyond her capacities as an individual to 
persuade a sufficient number of white Americans to end their opposition to it. Therefore, even 
though black and white Americans may have certain duties in a project for residential and social 
integration were it to be realized, this does not mean that they are subject to these requirements 
now. 
The corrective necessity of integration and Anderson’s public policies cannot establish an 
imperative of integration for any agent because they do not provide enough information about a 
host of factors that are necessary to justify duties of justice. As we’ve seen, these include facts 
about whether certain courses of action are (a) feasible, (b) morally permissible, and (c) not too 
costly for specific agents in current circumstances. Although Anderson’s integration fostering 
programs may be possible, permissible, and not overly burdensome for everyone involved if 
numerous distinct agents behave in certain ways, that does not imply that the same actions meet 
the above three criteria in the present situation where some act differently. In addition, 
requirements of justice are determined by (d) the likelihood that certain actions will advance justice 




(or less) reason to take a course of action to the extent that its outcomes are more (or less) just and 
the greater the likelihood of those outcomes. Hence, as I argued in chapter 1, we have a duty to 
take the available course of action that has the highest probability of promoting justice in the 
circumstances or that has the greatest expected justice, if it is permissible and not too 
burdensome.252 Just as the unjust motivations and conduct of other agents can affect the feasibility, 
permissibility, and burdens of taking certain actions, they can also influence the chances that those 
actions will have consequences that alleviate injustice. It follows that we must take into account 
how other agents’ wrongful conduct and dispositions affect each of these factors when ascertaining 
a particular agent’s obligations of justice. 
Justifying integration as a requirement of justice for a specific agent, therefore, means 
showing that it is the feasible and permissible course of action with reasonable costs that has more 
expected justice than all others. However, neither the necessity of integration for correcting racial 
injustice nor Anderson’s policies mean that promoting integration (through fostering her 
programs) has the greatest expected justice for any agent. That integration is necessary to correct 
some racial injustices only implies that we have certain defeasible reasons of justice that cannot 
be fulfilled in any other way. It does not mean that anyone has a conclusive duty to promote 
integration. These defeasible reasons can be defeated for an agent if supporting integration is 
infeasible, impermissible, too costly, or has less expected justice than available alternatives. 
Likewise, even if Anderson’s public policies are necessary to and could remove certain unjust 
disadvantages if implemented, promoting them may not be a duty for a particular agent because 
these policies may be less likely to advance justice than benefiting black neighborhoods (and 
 




potentially encouraging self-segregation) due to current and foreseeable levels of resistance from 
the state, local governments, or advantaged white Americans. Therefore, Anderson’s argument 
does not demonstrate that any moral agent has (2) a duty to support residential and social 
integration (through her policies) and to not hinder them, or even (3) a duty to promote integration 
(through her policies) at least in some ways. 
Of course, in spite of the deficiencies of Anderson’s case, black Americans, white 
Americans, the state, and many other moral agents may have a duty to promote integration. For 
example, real estate agents, homeowners, and housing authorities certainly have a duty not to deny 
African Americans’ access to white neighborhoods out of racial prejudice or stigma, which makes 
these neighborhoods more susceptible to integration. However, for multi-agent public policies and 
cases in which different ways of ameliorating racial injustice conflict, matters can be much more 
complicated. In these instances, we have to ascertain, for example, whether supporting integration, 
renewing black neighborhoods or encouraging self-segregation to foster black political 
solidarity253 has a better chance of securing more justice. My main critical point is that Anderson’s 
framework is not adequate for justifying any of these duties or how far they apply. Given the 
complexities of the factors involved in determining which action, all things equal, has the greatest 
expected justice, I will not be able to examine individual cases or to ascertain how general a 
requirement of integration or black self-segregation is. Nevertheless, this chapter puts us in a better 
position to discern what our duties are in respect to existing racial injustices because it more 
adequately shows us how to establish an imperative of justice and what mistakes to avoid. 
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3.5 Integration or Egalitarian Pluralism? 
Tommie Shelby sets out to show that residential integration is neither “a requirement of 
corrective justice” nor “a necessary instrument of corrective justice” or “the only viable remedy 
for the [unjust] disadvantages from which the ghetto poor suffer.”254 That is, he disagrees with 
both of Anderson’s core claims that racial integration is an imperative of justice and that it is 
necessary to rectify racial injustices. Instead, he argues that “black[] [Americans], including poor 
black[] [Americans], should be free to self-segregate and that this practice is not incompatible with 
justice” and contends that “integration [must] be voluntary … those who wish to bear the costs of 
integration should be enabled to integrate, but those who don’t want to should neither be pushed 
into residential integration nor condemned for not integrating.”255 
Shelby’s main arguments are based on his contention that correcting racial injustice can be 
achieved through an alternative that falls short of requiring integration. According to this 
“egalitarian pluralist vision, racial justice requires desegregation, social equality [i.e. freedom of 
association] and economic fairness. It does not require residential integration. Nor does it oppose 
it. It does not proscribe voluntary self-segregation in neighborhoods. Nor does it call for it … [The 
right response to] [u]njust race-based residential exclusion … [is] to prevent and rectify 
discriminatory treatment, to establish fair equality of opportunity, and to ensure equitable 
distribution of income and economic assets.”256 In other words, as opposed to requiring racial 
integration, “we should work to improve the residential environment of the unjustly disadvantaged, 
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that is, to make their neighborhoods less disadvantaged, but without aiming to rearrange 
neighborhood demographics by race.”257  
In support of his position, Shelby asks us to consider the possibility that “the egalitarian 
pluralist vision has been realized” such that “white[] [Americans] [have] demonstrated their 
willingness to integrate on fair terms,” “didn’t practice employment and housing discrimination, 
adequate schools were available to everyone, and an equitable distribution of material resources 
existed.”258 In these circumstances, “opportunities for interracial contact would exist in 
workplaces, the marketplace, and educational contexts,” “the broader public sphere, recreational 
contexts,” and “social media.”259 “Why, under these more just circumstances, would it be so 
important that white[] and black[] [Americans] live together in the same neighborhoods?”260 
The most obvious problem with Shelby’s proposal is that it seems like his egalitarian 
pluralist vision presupposes residential and social integration rather than being an alternative to it. 
For example, egalitarian pluralism involves no “discriminatory treatment” and “fair equality of 
opportunity,” but Anderson’s anti-stigmatization and social capital arguments contend that 
eliminating unconscious racial stigmatization and discrimination, the unfairness in opportunity 
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that they cause, and a fair distribution of social capital is not possible without residential and social 
integration.261 Even though Shelby says that interracial contact would exist in places besides 
residential neighborhoods, I have argued that racial stigmatization and unjust disadvantages in 
social capital would be mitigated to a greater degree if residential integration were realized too and 
that thereby it is necessary to adequately remove racial injustice.  
Moreover, when Shelby explicitly considers Anderson’s anti-stigmatization argument, he 
seems to accept (or at least does not dispute) her claim that residential integration is necessary to 
reduce white Americans’ unconscious racial stigmatization more effectively.262 In fact, when 
Shelby asks whether it would be “contrary to [African Americans’] duty of justice if they were to 
refuse to play this role in the moral reform of [white Americans],” he does not say “no” but that 
“[t]he answer depends … on the conditions under which they would be expected to play it.”263 If 
integration does not entail burdens that are “unreasonable,” “the costs and risks [are not] too great,” 
and white Americans are willing to lose “some of their existing [unjust] advantages,” then black 
Americans should, “in the spirit of reciprocity, seek out opportunities for greater interracial 
interaction.”264 This strongly suggests that Shelby thinks that segregated white Americans need to 
interact with black Americans in order to reduce unconscious racial stigmatization. However, 
unconscious stigmatization causes racial discrimination and unfairness in opportunity, which 
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Shelby says would be absent in an egalitarian pluralist society. Since the only way to sufficiently 
remove racial stigmatization and discrimination and unfair opportunities is through residential 
integration, egalitarian pluralism requires residential integration and it cannot show that integration 
is not necessary to correct racial injustice. 
Although Shelby does not criticize Anderson’s anti-stigmatization case, he does have a 
reply to the social capital argument. He acknowledges that “Anderson might nonetheless maintain 
that despite these other opportunities for interracial interaction [in the workplace, the marketplace, 
schools, etc.], social capital deficits would remain if black[] [Americans] self-segregate in 
neighborhoods and thus racial injustices would be left uncorrected. But would they? Let’s suppose 
that after ... white[] [Americans] demonstrate[] their willingness to integrate on fair terms, material 
inequalities remain because some black[] [Americans] forgo the social capital advantages that 
greater integration would afford them. Would this mean that racial justice wasn’t realized? No. 
Black[] [Americans] would have the real option of joining racially diverse communities, and 
consequently, wouldn’t have a justified complaint.”265 
This argument suffers from several mistakes. The central issue is whether we can, apart 
from integration, correct African Americans’ unjust social capital disadvantages. Shelby seems to 
argue that we can in one of two ways. First, Shelby might infer that if black Americans do not 
have a justified complaint against anyone and no one has any duties to further rectify disadvantages 
in social capital, then there are no more unjust social capital deficits left and that racial justice is 
realized. But this would involve a non sequitur. Even if white Americans satisfy all their duties to 
remove unjust disadvantages and black Americans are permitted to not further alleviate them, this 
 




does not imply that the resulting distribution is just. African Americans would still be much worse 
off in terms of social capital than they would be if white Americans had not closed their social 
networks and neighborhoods to them because of racial prejudice and stigmatization. So the lack 
of duties to increase black Americans’ social capital does not show that there are no more unjust 
social capital disadvantages for them. Second, Shelby may be arguing that if black Americans have 
a chance fairly to integrate into white communities that this by itself removes all unjust 
disadvantages in social capital. But this too would be false. The mere opportunity to move to an 
integrated neighborhood would not take away all the unjust difficulties African Americans 
experience in acquiring information about jobs, job referrals, cultural capital, and human capital 
because of past discrimination and that could be alleviated through actually integrating. It would 
only mean that they possess a chance of remedying these distributive injustices, not that they are 
gone. Either way, then, Shelby’s criticisms of Anderson’s social capital argument are unsuccessful, 
and the corrective necessity of integration remains intact. 
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that since unjust disadvantages in social capital would 
remain without residential integration, Shelby is not entitled to assume that African Americans are 
permitted to “forgo the social capital advantages that integration would afford them.” It may be 
true that individual black Americans are permitted to turn down benefits that would only affect 
them personally. However, the positive effects of individual black Americans choosing to integrate 
may extend beyond themselves to other black Americans by increasing the social capital in African 
American communities overall and by reducing racial stigma and thereby preventing unfairness in 
opportunity. Even though we have a right to turn down personal benefits, we do not have the 
authority to unilaterally cancel the reasons we have to mitigate injustices that harm others. Since 




from residential integration, everyone, including African Americans, has defeasible reasons of 
justice to support residential integration. Black Americans, therefore, have reasons and may have 
duties to other black Americans to integrate and to alleviate their unjust disadvantages, even if not 
to themselves. Shelby’s critique in effect treats segregated African Americans as if they were only 
a single individual, whereas they are a set of distinct individuals with moral claims on each other 
and everyone else. Hence, his objection to the social capital argument does not show that black 
Americans do not have a duty to integrate. Of course, this does not imply that African Americans 
do have a duty. They may have even stronger reasons of justice to self-segregate. Nevertheless, it 
is not true that black Americans couldn’t have “a justified complaint” against other black 
Americans for not taking advantage of opportunities to integrate. 
Finally, let us suppose, contrary to what seems to be the case, that residential and social 
integration are not needed to correct or to prevent racial injustice and that egalitarian pluralism (or 
some other alternative) is sufficient. In addition, suppose that implementing integration and 
egalitarian pluralism is possible, effective, permissible, and not too costly if significant numbers 
of black and white Americans, the state, and other moral agents each perform certain actions. 
Would this mean that no one or that segregated African Americans are not under a requirement to 
participate in residential or social integration? According to Shelby, “[i]f unjust racial inequality 
can be ended without racial integration, then integration is not an ‘imperative’ of justice in any 
meaningful sense.”266 This is incorrect. As I argued in the previous section, whether a specific 
agent has a duty to support integration, egalitarian pluralism, or some other outcome, partially 
depends on these actions’ relative expected justice. However, promoting integration may have the 
 




greatest expected justice even though it is not necessary to correct injustice. It may be that all the 
other options are much less likely to succeed in current circumstances. Therefore, even if 
integration is not a corrective necessity and egalitarian pluralism is sufficient, certain moral agents 
and black Americans may have a duty to foster the integration of white neighborhoods because 
that offers the best chance of mitigating injustice. 
As with racial integration, others’ wrongful dispositions and conduct matter for how likely 
benefiting segregated neighborhoods will ameliorate injustice relative to other courses of action in 
contemporary circumstances. “There is no doubt,” Shelby says, “a sense in which thriving black 
communities might be a utopian fantasy: advantaged white[] [Americans] won’t let it happen 
because it will cost them more than they want to pay and the forces of opposition aren’t strong 
enough to overturn this reactionary preference.”267 However, neither Anderson nor Shelby 
sufficiently appreciate the importance of these facts or adequately incorporate them into their 
arguments for and against integration. Rather, in justifying policies promoting integration or 
egalitarian pluralism as requirements of justice, they seem to think that we can ignore or idealize 
certain facts about the unjust motivations and actions of some existing agents. For the reasons I 
have given, this constitutes a serious flaw in their views about moral justification in nonideal 
theory. In the following and last section, I will examine why they deny that limitations or 
constraints caused by injustice do not affect what our requirements of justice are. 
3.6 Unjust Constraints and Compromising with Injustice 
Anderson and Shelby maintain that the ways in which moral agents motives and actions 
are unjust cannot undermine the cases they make for racial integration and egalitarian pluralism, 
 




even if they can affect the means by which their ideals should be realized.268 Anderson’s argument 
is that we should reject the idea that “a sound political philosophy must be realistic in … that it 
must accommodate people’s unwillingness to meet certain standards of justice … [P]eople’s 
refusal to do what morality requires does not generate a valid claim on their part to be let off the 
moral hook.”269 It is true that a person’s refusing to fulfill her obligations does not cancel those 
duties. However, this does not mean that other moral agents’ wrongful dispositions and actions 
cannot affect an agent’s duties, which is the position that I have relied upon in my arguments. As 
I have shown, other agents’ resistance to integration can make it infeasible, impermissible, too 
demanding, and less conducive to greater justice than courses of action that encourage continued 
segregation. For these reasons, justifying imperatives of justice is not immune to facts about 
people’s unwillingness to meeting their obligations. 
For Shelby, the problem with our requirements of justice being affected by unjust motives 
and conduct is that it entails “capitulating to injustice.”270 For example, Shelby denies that 
integration can be an imperative of justice for African Americans if it is the only available route 
to benefit black Americans because white Americans unjustly refuse to improve segregated black 
neighborhoods directly. In this case, “the only grounds [he] can see for insisting on … racial 
integration … is political feasibility—which is not a requirement of justice but rather a 
 
268 Anderson draws a distinction between the role of people’s motivations in justifying imperatives of justice and in 
selecting how to meet those requirements. Unjust motivations do not make a difference to “lay[ing] out an objective 
required by justice,” but “political philosophy should [not] ignore what people are willing to do … [when] 
implement[ing] policies capable of achieving that objective … Court-ordered busing of schoolchildren, if it causes 
white flight, may fail to integrate schools. Integrative policies may need to adjust their scale and timing, and be joined 
with incentives and public education, to win public acceptance.” Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 190. 
269 Anderson, 190. 
270 In this quote, Shelby is interpreting Anderson’s position. However, the concern about “capitulating to injustice” is 




compromise with injustice.”271 What Shelby means in this passage is not entirely clear, but he 
seems to think that requirements of justice are in some way incompatible with compromises with 
or capitulating to injustice. His view seems to be that a moral agent cannot have a duty of justice 
to do certain actions, if better alternatives would be available if others would act justly. He seems 
to think that taking those actions would constitute an unjustified failure not to resist injustice or be 
a wrongful surrender to injustice. 
Even if there is some price to be paid in not more actively resisting the terms of wrongdoers 
(e.g. by expressing one’s dissent and not accepting any benefits on less than fully just terms), it is 
not plausible that this loss always outweighs the potentially profound benefits of taking less than 
ideal remedies to injustice. If successful, the benefits of integration include substantially curtailing 
unjust disadvantages in social, cultural, and human capital, in employment and educational 
opportunities and in the life chances of black Americans for many future generations. We are not 
always permitted to turn down such significant advances in justice simply because others should 
do better and allow us to get even more. At the most, the disvalue of tolerating unjust constraints 
on one’s choices is one relevant factor in determining which course of action has the greatest 
expected justice. Of course, we may refuse to accept certain benefits in the present in the hopes of 
gaining more justice later on, but this fits into the general framework that I am proposing, which 
takes into account future consequences. Therefore, if wrongful intransigence means that improving 
segregated black communities is politically infeasible for the foreseeable future but integration is 
possible, then integration might be a requirement of justice for particular agents because it is their 
only available route to undo certain racial injustices. The converse is also true if injustice means 
 




that racial integration is infeasible and benefiting African Americans in their segregated 
neighborhoods is the only possible means of mitigating unjust racial inequalities. It is a false 
dichotomy, therefore, to say that a course of action is either a requirement of justice or forced upon 
us by unjustly created limitations of political feasibility, but not both. Constraints on an agent’s 





















In this dissertation, I have defended several claims that are significant for moral 
justification in nonideal theory. First, I have contended that all the main arguments for the necessity 
of ideal theory are mistaken. While I have allowed that ideal theory may be useful and even 
essential when we lack enough inductive evidence, often it is sufficient, necessary, and most 
important for nonideal theory to establish duties of justice based on the moral and descriptive facts 
of unjust circumstances instead. 
Second, I have argued that we should adopt a pragmatist moral epistemology that maintains 
that experiments in living (a) can provide better evidence and deliver better justified moral 
judgments than a priori methods, (b) that the empirical evidence they supply is necessary for 
justification, and (c) that their evidence can be part of a sufficient justification apart from a priori 
methods, if certain epistemological conditions are satisfied. Although experiments in living of 
moral views are not always available, feasible, or permissible to implement, it is often important 
to use and seek out the empirical evidence they provide because of the inadequacy of a priori 
methods.  
Third, I have stressed that duties of justice to realize principles, institutions, policies, and 
actions often depend on certain conditions, which may be absent in current and foreseeable 
circumstances. Therefore, in order to justify the existence of such duties, we must ascertain 
whether an agent can bring those conditions about and the likelihood that they will be realized. 
The next point is related to this one. 
Fourth, I have shown that the unjust conduct and motives of other agents is relevant for 




determine whether moral agents are subject to a requirement of justice including whether a certain 
course of action is feasible, morally permissible, not overly burdensome, and the probability that 
it will remedy injustice. For this reason, we saw that the principles that regulate a perfectly just 
society may not apply in unjust circumstances and that integration promoting policies that would 
rectify racial injustices if many African Americans, white Americans, and the state did their parts, 
may be infeasible or too unlikely to advance justice given the widespread white resistance that 
these policies currently confront. As we’ve seen, these issues are not merely of academic interest. 
For, both Anderson and Shelby’s arguments for integration and reviving black neighborhoods, 
respectively, fall significantly short of establishing their conclusions because they do not fully 
appreciate the importance of unjust conduct and dispositions for justifying obligations of justice. 
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that an agent’s own moral failings are important too because 
she needs to determine what she should do given that she will or is likely to act unjustly or have 
wrongful motivations. 
Fifth, I have argued that we have a duty to perform the available action with the greatest 
expected justice, all things equal. This explains why we cannot directly derive a duty to realize a 
perfectly just society, racial integration, or flourishing black neighborhoods from their great or 
supreme value in terms of justice. Instead, a moral agent has to compare the relative expected 
justice of various actions and whether supporting, for example, integration, the revitalization of 
black communities, or black self-segregation has the best chance of mitigating injustice in 
contemporary circumstances. 
The nonideal methodology that is represented by the above commitments is very different 
from those approaches, for example, that derive principles for nonideal theory directly from ideal 




(fundamental) principles of justice, or even those that hold that we must promote what is necessary 
to correct injustice if that is possible through the actions of numerous distinct agents. Each of these 
alternatives neglect or do not sufficiently recognize the importance of central factors for justifying 
our duties in an unjust world. In providing a more sound picture of moral justification in nonideal 
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